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I, TOO, SING AMERICA: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW FOR AMERICAN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS’
POST-KIOBEL JURISPRUDENCE, GUIDED BY AUSTRALIAN
AND INDIAN EXPERIENCES
ABSTRACT
In the excitement of the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s 2013
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. decision, one less-addressed matter is
the unresolved status of customary international law in American courts. This
Comment highlights a lack of literature engaging comparative study of
federally structured nations’ experiences implementing customary
international law within their state and federal courts, and proposes that such
a study may aid in resolving the American dilemma. This Comment studies
Australian and Indian experiences, then uses the findings to look back toward
the American experience for possible solutions for the status of customary
international law. While not endeavoring to resolve the entire issue of
customary international law status, this Comment finds three helpful
implications in the comparative study. Two are meta principles, and one is a
concrete canon suggestion that would diffuse a subset of problem areas for
customary international law implementation in American courts.
First, the American solution need not be as extreme as American theorists
argue, given that multiple other federal nations successfully engage and
implement customary international law within state and federal courts alike
without resorting to such absolute strategies. Second, demonstrating that
multiple other federal nations have similar reservations toward any sweeping
implementation of customary international law, popular condemnations of
America’s isolationism and exceptionalism from customary international law
should be more tightly correlated to a benign and unavoidable function of
federalism than to a malicious and uniquely American elitism. Finally,
borrowing from an Indian state court decision, this Comment proposes a
customary international law equivalent of a Charming Betsy canon for
interpreting municipal, state and federal laws. Under such a canon, when
there exist multiple possible constructions of a municipal, state, or federal law,
the construction conforming to customary international law would be used.
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Ultimately, this Comment finds that a look outside American borders for
resolution of domestic customary international law status provides a fresh
perspective to re-focus the standing polarized discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
The status of customary international law (CIL) in American courts is
unresolved. For years, academics had the luxury of addressing the issue
through abstract legal theory because its resolution was unnecessary.1 If the
resolution of CIL status seemed less than pressing in the past,2 Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. revamped a need for resolution by re-engaging judicial
dialogue on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which permits litigation for CIL
violations.3 As the American legal community returns its gaze to CIL in the
wake of Kiobel, some mode of CIL engagement and implementation is
necessary.4 Toward that aim, this Comment seeks to answer two questions.
First, considering the lack of resolution on CIL status in domestic courts, are
there paths toward resolution that have not been considered? Much of the
debate thus far appears to be a rehashing—and sometimes contortion—of
United States Supreme Court precedent.5 For all the acrobatics, none seems to
1 Unnecessary, perhaps, because of an American sense of dismissal to international custom adherence,
and because the express call for courts to apply CIL came only “where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative or judicial decision.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See JOHAN VAN
DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2010) (“I am well aware of
the fact that, as far as perceptions entertained by the outside world community are concerned, most Americans
don’t care too hoots.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 687
(2000) (“[W]hile Congress may not violate the Constitution, it is well established that Congress can violate
international law. The Supreme Court has directly held this with respect to treaties, and both Supreme Court
dicta and unanimous lower court authority support this with respect to customary international law.”)
(emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
2 See Bradley, supra note 1, at 689 (“It is not clear, however, why Charming Betsy should trump
Chevron deference with respect to violations of other forms of international law (non-self-executing treaties
and customary international law). Violations of those forms of law, after all, do not substantially implicate
domestic legal continuity; instead, they implicate foreign relations issues that would seem to fall within the
expertise of the executive branch.”).
3 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. ____ (2013) (finding that an Alien Tort Statute claim
for violations of CIL lacked standing in federal court due to extraterritoriality, though generally reinvigorating
CIL discussions and specifically reinvigorating talks of Alien Tort Statute utilization; both of which will
ultimately require some mode for implementing CIL in domestic courts). The Alien Tort Statute is codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
4 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 1. For purposes of this Comment, the term ‘implement’ will be used to mean make
binding domestic claw, and the term ‘engage’ to mean discuss, whether stating that something is or is not CIL,
looking to CIL for mere anecdotal or persuasive value.
5 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position]; contra Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State
Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (on the modern and revisionist theories of implementing customary
international law within United States courts); but see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts
and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Federal Courts]. These articles largely surround debate of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a 1938
decision. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Robert Schapiro and Ernest Young focus somewhat on precedent reinterpretation
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produce a successful solution or even reduce the tremendously polarized nature
of standing debates. Those debates are generally dominated by modernists,
who believe CIL carries de facto federal law status; and revisionists, who
assert that CIL has no binding status unless legislated.6 Finding that
comparative study of other nations’ implementation and engagement of CIL in
state and federal courts is an unexplored path,7 this Comment conducts such a
study of Australian and Indian precedent.
That study leads to the second focal question: can new paths shed light on
the original question of CIL status in American courts? Without endeavoring to
resolve the American CIL dilemma entirely, this Comment offers three
findings from the Australian and Indian experiences that may contribute
toward a coming solution for American jurisprudence. First, finding that
multiple other federal nations successfully engage and implement CIL within
state and federal courts alike without resorting to such absolute strategies as
those proposed by American theorists, the American solution(s) need not be so
extreme. Second, the Australian and Indian CIL experiences provide a
commentary on negative associations of seeming American indifference
toward CIL with American judicial exceptionalism; both that the United States
is not alone in such tendencies, and that there are multiple grounds for
asserting that the isolationism or exceptionalism should not be so tightly
correlated to elitism. Third, one Indian state court proposed a canon of
interpretation for municipal law relative to CIL that may resolve at least one of
America’s jurisdictional qualms.8 Considering the role of state courts in CIL
engagement, taking from both Indian and Australian precedent, this Comment
proposes a CIL-equivalent of a Charming Betsy canon9 for interpreting
as well, though at least with an eye toward reducing the polarized nature of the debates. See generally ROBERT
A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009); Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Incorporation of International
Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28 (2007).
6 See infra Part I.C.
7 While there appears no literature even noting the lack of comparative analysis in studies concerning
CIL status in American courts, the lack of comparative analysis is noted in legal academia broadly, and
procedure specifically. See John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States,
43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 546 (1995) (“Within the intellectual life of the American legal academy, comparative
law is a peripheral field.”); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into A
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709, 740 (2005) (“American proceduralists have not been
comparativists. . . . The problem in the U.S. is that comparative procedure is barely on the map.”).
8 Though not expressly stating so, that court likely used the term “municipal” to reference all domestic
law. See infra Part II.
9 That is, interpreting congressional statutes as consistent with international law; proposed by Chief
Justice Marshall in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). This proposal rests upon the
premise that the Charming Betsy canon itself is ill-fitted for CIL, if not entirely inapplicable. See generally The

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

124

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

municipal, state and federal laws relative to CIL. In sum, this Comment finds
that looking outside American borders for resolution of domestic CIL status
provides a much-needed fresh perspective to re-focus the standing polarized
discourse.
This Comment will consider the proposed theories’ application to both the
immediate Kiobel context—the “law of nations” in federal courts as prescribed
by the ATS—and the broader, longer-standing debate over the role of CIL in
state courts. Realizing a need for broader context and perspective, this
Comment will look to the two best-developed CIL jurisprudences from nonEuropean, federal states; those of India and Australia. The analysis of Indian
and Australian experiences will demonstrate that CIL can be engaged
throughout the courts of a federal nation, can be engaged without the extreme
models broadly proposed in American legal academia, can enrich legal
discussions, and needs to be tailored to each federal government.10 This final
point of necessary tailoring may contradict assertions that American
exceptionalism is unilateral, or grounded in elitist navel-gazing.11
Without question, the nuance of the three nations’ structures must be kept
in mind throughout this study. While Australia and India have more unitary
judicial systems—Australia’s federal circuit courts (the functional equivalent
of American federal district courts) are few, and only came into existence in
1999,12 and India has none13—the United States has 94 federal judicial
Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary International Law, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1215
(2008).
10 Cf. Adam M. Smith, Making Itself a Home - Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence:
The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 222 (2006) (per foreign law implementation, American
isolationist jurisprudence “is arguably a reasonable reaction to the forces impacting the American judicial
system.”).
11 See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (2003) (“When it
comes to American exceptionalism . . . Americans generally tend to strike the world as pushy, preachy,
insensitive, self-righteous, and usually, anti-French.”) (citing MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE
PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001) (“American exceptionalism has always
had two sides: the one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its
message should be ignored. . . . Faith in their own exceptionalism has sometimes led to a certain obtuseness on
the part of Americans, a tendency to preach at other nations rather than listen to them, a tendency as well to
assume that American motives are pure where those of others are not.”)). See also Marcus, supra note 7, at 710
(“[American procedural] exceptionalism also reinforces the tendency to view such navel-gazing as appropriate
because procedure is peculiarly parochial.”).
12 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) reg 20(3); Introduction to the Federal Court of
Australia, FED. CIR. CT. OF AUSTL., http://www.federalcircuitcourt.gov.au/html/introduction.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2014) (“The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was established by the Federal Circuit Court of
Australia Act 1999 (formerly the Federal Magistrates Act) and its jurisdiction at inception was conferred by
the Federal Magistrates (Consequential Amendments) Act 1999. These Acts received royal assent on 23
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districts.14 While Australia and India take relatively uniform CIL
interpretations despite their varying legal structures, America does law
differently. The character of the American dilemma is somewhat idiosyncratic;
permutated not only by federalism, but by how Americans conceive of their
federal system. In the late eighteenth century, the founders’ aspiration was for
broad states’ rights in times of peace.15 American states’ rights were
historically conceived not only functionally, but philosophically;16 envisioning
little comity for comity’s sake between state courts or federal district courts.
That idea is still alive today, and is more than nationalist exceptionalism for
exceptionalism’s sake. In fact, as this Comment’s conclusion will suggest, the
persistently implied conflation of elitism and judicial isolationism is neither
accurate nor fair.17 The United States functions through a distinct brand of
federalism that is unusually dualist; that is, bound by realms of original
jurisdiction for state and federal courts alike.18 Simply ignoring CIL is not an
option, and will only nurse the nation’s isolationist, elitist and exceptionalist
image problems.19
The United States is in need of a unique solution that reflects its unique
construction of federalism. To that end, this Comment observes that American

December 1999. The Court is an independent federal court under the Australian Constitution. It is a federal
court of record and a court of law and equity. Under section 8 of the FCC Act the Court is constituted by the
Chief Judge and judges as appointed. Judges are appointed under the Act as justices in accordance with
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. . . . The establishment of the Federal Circuit Court marked a change
in direction in the administration of justice at the federal level in Australia. Australia had not previously had a
lower level federal court, although a considerable amount of federal law work had been done in state and
territory courts of summary jurisdiction under the provisions of the Judiciary Act.”).
13 See Legal Research Guide: India, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
india.php (last updated Jan. 21, 2014) (chart illustrating Indian court structure).
14 District
Courts,
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
15 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
16 See id.
17 See infra Part III.B.
18 See infra Part I.C.2.
19 Smith, supra note 10, at 220 n.13, citing Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States
Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597 (2000) (noting the “general,
broadly expressed fear regarding the American hegemony of global legal structures.”). Cf. VAN DER VYVER,
supra note 1, at 11–12 (2010) (“Isolation relations of the United States have over the years been tainted by a
certain mind-set. First and foremost in this regard is the notion that the United States is something special and
should be treated differently within the international arena. In conformity with this conviction, the United
States has in the past maintained a degree of isolationism from institutions, norms and obligations that have
come to be perceived as conducive to the promotion of international comity.”); Marcus, supra note 7, at 710
(“Few polities are as self-consciously exceptional as the Americans . . . .”). See also DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 185–88 (2008).
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solutions regarding the implementation and engagement of CIL may benefit
from comparison to studies addressing American importation of foreign law.20
Professor Judith Resnik “take[s] issue with the assumptions that the critical
field of play [for importing foreign law] is federal law and that the
transformative players are on the Supreme Court of the United States.”21 This
Comment makes a similar assertion for the domestic importation of CIL: from
other federal nations’ experiences, we learn that a variety of state court
interpretations of CIL and its role within their jurisdictions are both possible
and healthy.22 For purposes of this discussion, the most notable difference in
foreign law and CIL debates is that while foreign law importation is mostly, if
not entirely optional, and arguably unnecessary outside the narrow scope of
choice of law cases,23 CIL is less of an optional matter because most of the
world considers the entire world bound by it. This Comment does not endeavor
to resolve the debate of modernists and revisionists, or to propose total
resolution of America’s CIL quagmire in one fell swoop. This Comment
further will not address related concerns of foreign law importation, save
drawing parallels to CIL importation.24 The goal of this Comment is not to
promulgate further abstract legal theory, but to propose a few small steps
toward a new way forward both for federal courts reacting to Kiobel and for
state courts that stand to be enriched by the sweeping history and experience
that CIL offers.
Part One will explore recent history of the CIL debate in America, which
will demonstrate the lack of resolution on the matter and the pressing need for
such resolution. Part Two will assess CIL engagement in Australian and Indian
courts, demonstrating in both contexts that CIL deeply enriches discussions
20

That is, the domestic law of other nations, distinct from international law. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN ET

AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 3 (2003).
21 Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism,

Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1580 (2006).
22 Mirroring the sentiment of Dean Robert Schapiro’s “polyphonic federalism” theory that diverse state
and federal court perspectives of CIL fosters “a collaborative process of illumination,” though the Australian
and Indian experiences are not necessarily bound within his promulgated “understanding of customary
international law as nonpreemptive federal law.” SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170.
23 See Smith, supra note 10, at 242 (“Explaining his heavy reliance on foreign precedent, Justice Joseph
Story (who served on the bench from 1811 to 1845) argued that ‘[foreign law] offered a reservoir of solutions
to problems that American law had not yet faced.’ As America advanced, and its own ‘reservoir’ of solutions
grew, the need for foreign law declined.”).
24 For analysis of foreign law importation, see Resnik, supra note 21, at 1572 (“The effort to delegitimate
the use of foreign law is, in short, part of larger battles about the role of judges in the American polity and the
role of this nation in the world. The congressional proposals aimed at banning foreign law provide a window
not only into nationalist but also into anti-judicial sentiments in America.”); Smith, supra note 10.
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even on purely national issues. As Justice Breyer is prone to preach, there is
much to be gained by considering how other nations’ courts consider similar
matters at similar times.25 Part Three will consider the application of
Australian and Indian findings to the American experiment. The value of a new
midway forward in the implementation of CIL for American state courts is a
seat at the table in the implementation and engagement of CIL, and a deeply
enriched jurisprudence. Further, given the tremendously polarized nature of
monist and dualist debates,26 there is room for argument that the reason
American state courts so rarely engage CIL in their legal analysis is not
because CIL is of no use to them, but because they presume they would be
boxed into federal court interpretations. A workable theory must precede the
opening of a floodgate of cases.
The conclusion will summarize modest suggestions for a new way forward
in American interpretation and engagement of CIL. American importations
from the Australian and Indian experiences could impact the nation’s
separation of powers, the nation’s understanding of promissory estoppel, and
even the legalities of killing of foreign nationals denied their consular rights in
violation of treaty law and customary international law alike. These
possibilities are worth the journey.
I. HISTORY OF CIL DEBATES IN THE UNITED STATES
Though arguably infrequently cited in American precedent, American
debates over CIL status are long and fraught with impasses. This section will
recount the heated history of what precedent does engage CIL, ultimately
suggesting that a bit of outside perspective could hardly hurt and could
potentially greatly behoove the resolution of the American quandary.
A. Confusion and Dissention Begin with the Mere Definition of CIL
The law of nations, referenced here as CIL, arises out of custom and is
amorphous by nature.27 CIL is that part of international law not codified by
25 See generally Justice Steven Breyer, Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia
and Stephen Breyer: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, U.S. Association of Constitutional
Law Discussion (Jan. 13, 2005) (American University Washington College of Law) (transcript available at
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757
FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument) [hereinafter Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices].
26 See infra Part I.C.
27 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 165; DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2002)
(“Custom is rooted not in the high positivism that only formal legal organs (courts and legislatures) can make
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formal legal instruments or embodied in formal agreements (treaties,
conventions and covenants).28 CIL is established by two codependent
components: uniform state practice and opinio juris, a sense of legal obligation
motivating that state practice.29 The International Court of Justice Statute
defines CIL as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”30 Generally,
legal custom is believed to rise to CIL when states comply out of a sense of
legal obligation rather than mere self-interest.31
However time-honored and beneficial to humanity, such an open-ended
jurisprudence prone to continued expansion is grossly problematic. Throughout
the world, CIL faces substantial challenges in its understanding, and thus its
application, particularly in domestic courts.32 Academics and practitioners
alike disagree on what sort of state action constitutes qualifying “state
practice.”33 Some consider documents such as United Nations General
Assembly resolutions, which are inherently non-binding, as evidence of CIL.34
Other common disagreements include the breadth of consensus among states
required for the tipping point of “state practice,” the threshold at which
voluntary action becomes legal obligation, and debate on a clear delineation
between state practice and opinio juris.35 Perhaps ironically in light of
American courts’ hesitance to engage, let alone implement CIL, the Obama
administration’s Department of State maintains, “[t]he United States considers
many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”36 Such CIL
law but rather in a historicist insight that law resides in the spirit of a people and community, and custom is the
expression of that will”). See also JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26
(2005) (“CIL is best modeled as behavioral regularities that emerge when states pursue their interests on the
international stage”); Niles Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State
Practice in International Norm Creation 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 275–310 (2007).
28 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 164.
29 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27, at 24.
30 International Court of Justice Statute Art. 38. See also BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 27 (“To
show a rule of customary international law, one must prove to the satisfaction of the relevant decision-maker
(whether it be an international tribunal, domestic court, or government or inter-governmental actor) that the
rule (1) has been followed as “general practice,” and (2) has been ‘accepted as law.’”).
31 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27, at 23.
32 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 27 (“Nonetheless, substantial difficulties face domestic courts
when they are required to determine whether a particular norm qualifies as customary international law.”). See
also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27, at 23.
33 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27, at 23.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 24.
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/
treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2013, 9:57 PM).
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consideration is particularly notable because the U.S. Senate never ratified the
treaty, though the United States became a signatory in 1970.37
While debates over the employment of laws beyond our own may be
perceived as unique to our time or to America, neither is the case.38 Debates
over the implementation of foreign law in domestic legal structures are neither
narrow nor new, though still somewhat unsettled.39 Debates over the
formulation of CIL, equally unsettled, are not unique to our time. In fact, they
were arguably better understood in medieval times.40 According to Ernest
Young and Emily Kadens, “while the details may have changed, the thrust of
these critiques of customary-law formation have been around for more than
half a millennium. There is, if you will, no settled customary practice
governing how to define customary rules of law.”41 Because no practice for
defining CIL is entirely settled, there should be no surprise that there is no
settled practice for implementing CIL in domestic courts. As the girth of what
is at least popularly considered CIL continues to grow, a method for
implementation would prove all the more helpful. The formulation of CIL, the
implementation of foreign law, and the domestic implementation of treaties
receive judicious academic attention.42 The domestic implementation of CIL, a
separate matter entirely and the sole focus of this Comment, is unsettled
despite academic attention that some deem disproportionate.43

37

Id.
See generally VAN DER VYVER, supra note 1.
39 That is, the application of one nation’s laws or precedents in another nation’s courts. See Smith, supra
note 10, at 219–20 (“However, while the intensity of the debate [over applying foreign law in domestic courts]
has been unequaled elsewhere, it is a mistake to brand this discussion an idiosyncrasy of the modern American
system.”). See generally Resnik, supra note 21.
40 Ernest Young & Emily Kadens, How Customary Is Customary International Law? 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 885, 911 (2013).
41 Id. at 911. See also BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 27–28 (noting the tension between the
elements of CIL); Smith, supra note 10, at 220.
42 See Young & Kadens, supra note 39, at 911 (on the formulation of customary international law);
Smith, supra note 10, at 220 (on the implementation of foreign law in domestic courts).
43 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 42–45 (noting that the debate is unsettled); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 517 (2002)
(“[T]o an outsider, the heat seems disproportionate to the practical importance of the issues.”). But cf.
SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 165 (“The passion underlying this debate [between modernists and revisionists]
stems in large measure from its application to human rights litigation.”).
38
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B. Problems from the Start: A Body of Law as Amorphous as CIL is
Anathema to a Nation of Laws, Not of People
Recognizing CIL, let alone adjudicating its implementation, has long
proven problematic in American courts.44 In a nation built expressly upon
express laws,45 the notion of implementing a body of law not codified
anywhere, let alone by the nation itself, is incongruous. Some argue that part of
the modern problem is rooted in a change in the world’s conception of CIL
over time. While CIL “was traditionally limited to customary practices that
nations followed from a sense of legal obligation,” indeed, as a traditional CIL
definition requires,46 human rights norms are now generally conceived as CIL,
despite less than uniform state practice—let alone intent to be legally bound.47
For all the academic fervor, the comparative application of CIL within
federal structures, let alone with attention to how and why federal states face
specific issues, appears insufficiently addressed.48 To that end, a federal
quagmire of domestic CIL application is not unique to the United States. Other
nations, too, are straining to discern how to apply CIL within federal
frameworks. Though heated academic debates over the domestic

44 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 28–30 (recounting the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in The
Paquette Habana, 1900).
45 WILLIAM SAFIRE, Government of Laws, Not of Men, in SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 293 (1993)
(noting use of the phrase “a government of laws, not of men” in John Adams’ 1778 draft of the Massachusetts
Constitution and by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison).
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)
(defining CIL as “general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”).
47 Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN
BAG 356, 366 (1998).
48 While some comparative analysis on the importation of foreign law is in print, there appears to exist
virtually no literature so much as noting the lack of comparative analysis of CIL importation. One 2006 law
review comment compares the narrow plights of Native Americans and Australian Aboriginals in enforcing
emerging CIL rights in their respective nations’ domestic courts, though without broader considerations for
fully-crystallized CIL, and without much consideration of confounding variables inherent in the nations’
structures. See generally John D. Smelcer, Using International Law More Effectively to Secure and Advance
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Towards Enforcement in U.S. and Australian Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
301 (2006). For discussion of the lack of comparative foreign law analysis, see Smith, supra note 10, at 221
(“What remains lacking is any truly ‘comparative’ understanding of how different countries approach [foreign
law in domestic courts]. That is, while the use or absence of foreign law in specific states is clear, there is little
literature that attempts to use the experiences of given states in their use of comparative law as a tool to
understand other states’ decisions to do so.”).
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implementation of CIL in the United States exist, there appears to be no
comparative analysis of the same issue facing other federal nations.49
1. On Its Face, Modern CIL Does Not Seem to Fit the American Federal
Judiciary Model
While there exists no perfect formula for the domestic implementation of
CIL, one could easily posit that top-heavy centralized governments have an
easier time authoritatively applying the law domestically, pronouncing as the
law of the land what was never implemented through legislation or even
necessarily agreed to by an executive. Federal nations face a steeper climb in
implementing CIL. Through the exploration of Australian and Indian
jurisprudence, this Comment will ask whether federal nations present
isolationist tendencies relative to CIL, and whether the common thread is
federalism. One scholar, noting the lack of comparative legal analysis of
foreign law importation (perhaps paying insufficient homage to the works of
Judith Resnik and others), studied Indian jurisprudence on foreign law for
American implications.50 His conclusions were twofold: the debate over
foreign law propriety is oversimplified in and out of America and “American
isolationist jurisprudence” “is arguably a reasonable reaction to the forces
impacting the American judicial system.”51 Further, “there is arguably enough
history and esteem for today’s U.S. courts to rely solely on their own
precedents,” rather than look to foreign law. While CIL is less optional in some
instances, such as ATS litigation, this explanation may speak to why other
nations look to CIL so frequently—as a supplement to either small or illesteemed domestic precedents; issues simply not facing American courts.52
Similarly, the easier application of CIL within non-federal frameworks may
be due to the Eurocentric nature of international law.53 That said, federalism is

49 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 5; contra Koh, supra
note 5; but see Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 5. While this author could not find so much
as mention of the lack of comparative analysis on domestic CIL implementation, Adam Smith lamented the
parallel lack of comparative analysis on the implementation of foreign law. Smith, supra note 10, at 221
(“[W]hile the use or absence of foreign law in specific states is clear, there is little literature that attempts to
use the experiences of given states in their use of comparative law as a tool to understand other states’
decisions to do so.”).
50 Smith, supra note 10, at 221.
51 Id. at 221–22.
52 Id. at 230.
53 See generally ELIZABETH BEYERLY, EUROCENTRIC INTERNATIONAL LAW? CONTEMPORARY
DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVES (1998).
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not the problem to be rooted out. Despite its differences from Eurocentric
frameworks, federalism is worth keeping.54 Federalism is particularly valuable
to diverse nations striving to accommodate minorities.55 Its celebration did not
end with the Federalist Papers. In the early twentieth century, India’s modern
founders believed that federalism was vital to the protection of the diversity
that made their coming nation great: “[t]he ultimate Constitution of India must
be federal, for it is only in a federal constitution that units differing so widely
in constitution as the provinces and the States can be brought together while
retaining internal autonomy.”56 Because federalism is worth keeping, a better
theoretical path must be fleshed out for federal nations to implement CIL.
Any state’s approach “to the relationship between international law and
domestic law raises significant issues of political theory.”57 The importation of
non-domestic law—foreign, international, or CIL—into most any nation’s
courts requires both great finesse and general consensus on implementation.
Where some scholars are quick to note that the United States is far from the
only nation to ever wrestle with the importation of non-domestic law, (one
citing seven centuries’ history of nations who worked through foreign law
qualms),58 other scholars contend that the American position did not simply
resolve over time as analysts may expect. Where “[o]ne might have assumed
that the need to press a unique national identity would correlate with the
newness of a country, seeking to establish its own authority, . . . the aging of
this country has not produced a relaxed approach to law from abroad.”59
Further, domestic legal isolation cannot always be assumed to follow new

54 See generally SCHAPIRO, supra note 5; Ernest Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative
Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427 (2013).
55 In fact, according to Ernest Young, “anyone seriously concerned with the well-being of minorities in a
democratic society ought to be a proponent of federalism.” Young, supra note 54, at 428. Contra Winston P.
Nagan & Benjamin Goodman, Inflated Federalism and Deflated International Law: Roberts CJ v. The ICJ, 12
GLOBAL JURIST, Iss. 1, Article 1 (2012).
56 M. GOVINDA RAO & NIRVIKAR SINGH, A Historical Review of Indian Federalism, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM IN INDIA (2006) available at Oxford Scholarship Online,
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195686937.001.0001/acprof-978019
5686937-chapter-3 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
57 Henry Burmester & Susan Reye, The Place of Customary International Law in Australian Law:
Unfinished Business, 21 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 39, 49 (2000).
58 See Smith, supra note 10, at 220 (“[W]hile the intensity of the debate has been unequaled elsewhere, it
is a mistake to brand this discussion an idiosyncrasy of the modern American system.”) (Smith noted pervasive
Irish concerns of English law importation since the fourteenth century and many nations’ concern about
American law’s “imperialistic justice,” among other issues).
59 Resnik, supra note 21, at 1573–74.

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

I, TOO, SING AMERICA

133

polities in the face of the likes of South Africa’s new constitution,60 which
requires that any court, tribunal, or forum interpreting the nation’s Bill of
Rights “must consider international law and may consider foreign law.”61
Perhaps not surprisingly, a comparative analysis of Indian and American
foreign law importation concluded that American isolationist jurisprudence
was more justified than given credit.62 Again, all this analysis inquires as to the
standing of foreign law in American courts, rather than CIL. The general
principles of limbo are equally applicable to CIL, and the lack of attention to
CIL bolsters the need for further attention to this Comment’s aims.
2. Both the U.S. Constitution and the Alien Tort Statute Acknowledge CIL
and Call for Its Domestic Incorporation
The American founders’ intent was not for American jurists to ignore CIL.
The United States Constitution gives a passing glance to CIL in Article 1,
Section 8: “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations[.]”63 Likewise, the Alien Tort Statute reads, “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”64
That the modern federalism invention would face new challenges applying
custom should not be a shock. Where traditional English constitutional law
“was an unwritten mixture of laws, customs, principles, and institutions,”
America’s founding fathers conceived of a constitution as a
written “fundamental law circumscribing the government.”65 Once America’s
laws of governance were defined to a text—and a short one, at that—reliance
on extra textual authority would require its own protocol. That protocol
remains incomplete.66

60

Id. at 1574 (“[O]ne can find new polities (such as South Africa) open to international norms.”).
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1) (punctuation excluded) (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a
court, tribunal or forum– (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”).
62 Smith, supra note 10, at 222.
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 10.
64 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added).
65 GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA 173 (2011).
66 See BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 27–29 (§ II.B.2: “Discerning Whether Customary
International Law Exists in a Particular Case”).
61

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

134

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

C. American Precedent Narrowed CIL Implementation Discussions Over
Time
Within the United States, debates over CIL application are largely held
between monists and dualists, also known as modernists and revisionists.
These positions were best distilled by David Bederman:
The monist approach, in essence, is based on the idea that
international law and domestic law are parts of the same legal system,
but that international law is higher in prescriptive value than national
law. A dualist approach, by contrast, assumes that international law
and domestic law are separate and distinct legal systems that operate
on different levels, and that international law can only be enforced in
national law if it is incorporated or transformed.67

Modernists contend that CIL not only should be implemented domestically, but
is de facto binding federal law, overriding whatever inconsistencies may arise
with state law.68 Revisionists view CIL as state law at best, subject to each
state’s acceptance.69
The United States is a dualist nation.70 Bederman reached this conclusion
by answering four inquiries: “whether international law can prevail over the
Constitution,” finding it could not;71 “whether customary international law is
part of federal common law or state common law,” finding that “most courts
and commentators” viewed CIL as federal law;72 “whether states of the Union
are obliged to observe customary international law,” finding that while the
topic was subject to heated debate because the Supremacy Clause does not
67

BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 40.
SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 167.
69 Id. at 167. Robert Schapiro says the dualist school is dead despite still being utilized by the U.S.
Supreme Court and throughout academia.
70 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 40 (“The United States can rightly be regarded as a dualist
nation”). Cf. SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 167 (“Both the modern view and the revisionist approach understand
customary international law in dualist terms.”).
71 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 40.
72 Id. at 42–43 (“The view of most courts and commentators is that customary international law is federal
law. This means, at a minimum, that cases involving claims to exclusively customary international law rights
and duties (some kinds of diplomatic immunities or law of the sea privileges, for example) may be decided by
the federal courts.”) citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 111 (1), (2) (1987); for contrast, citing Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 1948) (“[T]he law
of New York stands, and it must be owned that the result is not clear. The most recent authority on the matter
in international law is ‘The Research in International Law’ of the Harvard Law School, published in 1932—a
‘Restatement,’ so to speak, of international law. Article 15 of this recognizes the jus transitus innoxii, but goes
no further; and the ‘Comment,’ which discusses the authorities at length, at best leaves open the question as to
civil process, with perhaps some intimation that as to it there is no immunity.”).
68
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expressly uplift CIL to preempt state law, the U.S. Supreme Court at least
hinted that the federal government possesses a “dormant foreign relations
power” barring state legislation that undermines American foreign relations
interests (notably, citing American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi,73 which the
Supreme Court declined to follow five years after Bederman’s book was
published in Medellin v. Texas74 in 2008);75 and “whether customary
international law can be ‘trumped’ by federal statutes and executive
determinations,” finding that pre-existing treaties or domestic statutes were
widely believed to take precedent over CIL.76
The monist approach is expressly codified, for instance, in South Africa’s
relatively new constitution: “[c]ustomary international law is law in the
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament.”77 Critics say this approach “restricts the sovereignty of the State
and may accordingly limit the capacity of the internal political process to
oversee the extent of the state’s international obligations and domestic
powers.”78
Where revisionists posit through a dualist framework that absolutely no
international law is binding American law unless expressly codified by
domestic legislatures,79 modernists posit that international law is part and
parcel of American law.80 The modernist approach is unfaithful to the dualist
tenets of the American judicial structure through its unilateral proclamations.81

73

American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008) (“The United States maintains that the President’s
constitutional role ‘uniquely qualifies’ him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on
compliance with an ICJ decision and ‘to do so expeditiously.’ We do not question these propositions. . . .
American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, (Article II of the Constitution places with the President the ‘vast share of
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations’) . . . Such considerations, however, do not allow us to
set aside first principles. The President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power,
‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’”) (internal citations omitted).
75 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 43–44; id. at 43, n. 47 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968) and noting that Amer. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 1100, 1100 (2003) “appl[ied] Zschernig and
discuss[ed] the ‘contrasting theories of field and conflict pre-emption evident in the Zschernig opinions’”).
76 Id. at 40–45.
77 John Dugard, International Law and the South African Constitution 1 EURO. J. INT’L L. 77, 79 (1997)
citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 232. See also Burmester & Reye, supra note 57, at 49.
78 Burmester & Reye, supra note 57, at 49, citing D. Feldman, Monism, Dualism and Constitutional
Legitimacy, 20 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 105 (1999).
79 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 5, at 816.
80 See generally Koh, supra note 5.
81 See BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 40 (“The United States can rightly be regarded as a dualist
nation”). Cf. SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 168 (“Both the modern view and the revisionist approach understand
74
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The “revisionist” approach is difficult to flesh out in practice.82 As the
comparative analysis section of this Comment will demonstrate, neither
extreme is necessary for either of America’s fellow federal, non-European
former British colonies to engage and implement CIL within their state and
federal courts.
Prior to Kiobel, two United States Supreme Court decisions spawned strong
debate amongst American international legal academia. Both narrowed the
issue of domestic CIL implementation and sparked avid debate, albeit the
former coming nearly six decades after the decision.83 Still, the debates
allowed relatively no way forward, functionally proving nothing more than
abstract legal theory.
1. Erie Sparked Debate Between Modernists and Revisionists
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,84 though decided in 1938, became the
center of debate in 1997 when two soon-to-be-branded revisionists sparked an
ardent though easily overlooked dispute among American legal scholars.85 The
academics debated the implementation of CIL within the nation’s domestic
courts, state and federal. Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith
asserted that while American jurists and academics alike came to view CIL as
federal law over time, Erie stood for the proposition that such a rule was
contrary to American constitutional history and violated the most essential
aspects of federalism, separation of powers and democracy.86 Bradley and

customary international law in dualist terms.”); SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 168 (“The modern approach fails to
appreciate the potential benefits of plurality and dialogue.”).
82 The very use of the term “revisionist” is ironic. If the modernist approach is, from its very name, not
the original theory at play, and “revisionists” point to something existing prior to the modernist theory, could
the “revisionist” term be a misnomer for something perhaps more “originalist?” Revising something inherently
modern should not necessarily imply creating something new.
83 For debates over Erie, see generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra
note 5; contra Koh, supra note 5; but see Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 5. For debates
over Sosa, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, & Davis H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); William S. Dodge,
Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007); Young, supra
note 5.
84 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85 Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365,
367, n.6 (2002) (“The current fracas [between monists and dualists] seems largely to have been prompted by
the Bradley and Goldsmith article in 1997”). Easily overlooked, that is, because the theories seemed to have
little real-world application; no matter how fascinating they were.
86 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 5; contra Koh, supra
note 5; but see Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 5.

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

I, TOO, SING AMERICA

137

Goldsmith’s opponents, including professor Harold Koh, perceived their
analysis as a revision of American legal history, thus branding them
“revisionists.”87 Koh retorted, “that United States federal courts shall
determine questions of customary international law as federal law” was a
“hornbook rule.”88 Bradley and Goldsmith responded to Koh, holding their
ground.89 The lines were drawn, and the theories were polarized. So polarized,
in fact, that neither proved particularly workable.90 The stalemate could easily
be perceived as inconsequential: cases concerning the domestic
implementation of CIL were not exactly pouring into American courts.91
2. Sosa Slightly Narrowed the Debate but Demonstrated a Stalemate
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, which again engaged CIL discussion.92 At the end of an extensive
litigation trail, the Supreme Court held that CIL violations were, indeed,
permissible claims under the ATS; however, that Appellee Alvarez-Machain’s
short detention was an insufficient claim.93 Legal commentaries in the
aftermath of Sosa only demonstrated the unworkable stalemate of modernists
and revisionists.94 Where modernists “stressed the Supreme Court’s
affirmation that customary international law could function as binding law
without being specifically so designated by Congress,” revisionists
“emphasized that the Court accepted only a narrow category of customary
international law claims, and even then, only in the unusual and limited
statutory context of the Alien Tort Statute.”95 Neither court nor commentary
provided a workable solution. In courtrooms, if not in academia, the matter of
CIL and ATS quieted somewhat until Kiobel in 2013.96

87 Koh, supra note 5, at 1824 (on the modern and revisionist theories of implementing customary
international law within United States courts).
88 Id. at 1824.
89 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 5.
90 See generally SCHAPIRO, supra note 5; Young, supra note 85.
91 See Meltzer, supra note 43, at 517 (“As to the question whether CIL should be viewed as federal
common law, the number of cases whose outcome would clearly be affected by one or another answer seems,
at least at present, to be rather small.”).
92 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
93 Id. See also SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 167.
94 See generally Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 83; Dodge, supra note 83; Young, supra note
5.
95 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 167.
96 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. ____ (2013) at 1.
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3. Kiobel Re-Sparked Debate and Further Narrowed ATS Parameters
On April 17, 2013, the United States Supreme Court published its decision
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.97 A Nigerian widow residing in the
United States sued Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations for several claims
under the ATS98 of alleged aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations
committed by the Nigerian government in Nigeria.99 The ATS, an infrequently
utilized section of the United States Code, grants district courts “original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”100 After a
District Court dismissed some of the claims, the Second Circuit fully dismissed
the case on grounds that corporate liability is not recognized by the law of
nations.101 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer
whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability.102 The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments, then requested supplemental briefs on “whether
and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under
the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.”103 After hearing a second round of oral
arguments on the supplements, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s dismissal of the entire complaint on grounds of an unsurmounted
presumption against extraterritoriality.”104
Though Kiobel closed a certain door to extraterritoriality under the ATS,
every decision noted that more issues were left undecided.105, 106 While

97

Id. at 1.
According to the ATS, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. at 1,
citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
99 Id. at 1.
100 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
101 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 1.
102 Id. at 3.
103 Id. at 1.
104 Id. at 3.
105 Id., Roberts, C.J. at 11–12; Kennedy, J. at 1; Alito, J. at 1 (joined by Thomas, J.); Breyer, J. at 14
(joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.).
106 In the early interim since the Supreme Court announced Kiobel, much of the pertinent commentary
appears to surround ATS jurisdiction. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common
Law Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301 (2014) (“This Article argues against new or presumptive limits on the
extraterritorial application of the common law.”); Joel Slawotsky, ATS Liability for Rogue Banking in A PostKiobel World, 37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 125 (2014) (“This article opines that providing
sophisticated financial services such as performing financial transactions and services for rogue regimes,
98
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declining to clarify, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that former Attorney
General William Bradford’s 1795 opinion “Breach of Neutrality,” concerning
the attack of a British colony in Sierra Leone involving American citizens and
making one of the earliest known references to the ATS, “defies a definitive
reading.”107 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence approvingly characterized Chief
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion as “careful to leave open a number of
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort
Statute.”108 Justice Alito noted that “[t]his formulation obviously leaves much
unanswered, and perhaps there is wisdom in the Court’s preference for this
narrow approach.”109 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in judgment opined that his
proposed approach would preserve the promise that other cases might be able
to be brought under the ATS.110
As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence predicted, “other cases may arise with
allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting
persons . . . and in those disputes the proper implementation of the
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further
elaboration and explanation.”111 Kiobel left unanswered questions on CIL, and
perhaps opened a door for the American legal community to return its attention
to the merits of CIL, after polarizing debates between monists and dualists
were left unresolved in classrooms, courtrooms, and the pages of American
law reviews in the 1990s and 2000s.112 CIL, the rest of the world’s attention to
it, and acute awareness of the United States’ lack thereof, did not simply go
away because America did not resolve a stance toward it. The application of
CIL within federal structures will continue to be an issue for the United States
and other federal nations. In the aftermath of Kiobel, the United States may be
far off from seeing CIL implemented domestically under the ATS. Before
reaching a question of what tenets of CIL will be enforced, America will likely
see test cases refining the Kiobel ambiguities of “touch and concern” and
corporate liability. (That is, whether tortious activity occurring abroad
sufficiently implicates American interests to justify litigation in U.S. courts,
despots, terrorists and drug cartels may constitute conduct qualifying for ATS jurisdiction in a post-Kiobel
world for several reasons.”).
107 Kiobel, 569 U.S. Roberts, C.J. at 11–12; Curtis Bradley, Agora: Kiobel, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509
(2012).
108 Kiobel, 569 U.S. Kennedy, J. at 1.
109 Id., Alito, J. at 1.
110 Id., Breyer, J. at 14.
111 Id., Kennedy, J. at 1.
112 See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 5; contra Koh, supra
note 5; but see Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 5.
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and whether ATS claims may be brought against corporations, respectively.)
Those test cases, however, are coming quickly. A potential circuit split on
corporate liability took only eight months.113 Should forthcoming circuit court
decisions be granted cert to the Supreme Court, federal courts may soon find
themselves interpreting CIL for its application under the ATS.114
4. Unresolved Still Today: Potential Circuit Splits Developing over Kiobel
The D.C. Circuit cases immediately responded to Kiobel and focused on
the “touch and concern” issue. A mere month after the Supreme Court decided
Kiobel, the D.C. Circuit held that a case concerning events that occurred in and
around the American embassy in Nairobi (and were planned in the United
States) sufficiently touched and concerned the U.S. to overcome the ATS
presumption against extraterritoriality and establish proper jurisdiction for the
claim.115 In a separate matter two days later, the D.C. Circuit emphasized
Kiobel’s limited touch and concern parameters, holding against
extraterritoriality for concerning conduct in Iran committed by that nations’
Supreme Leader and its president.
Courts within the Second and Ninth Circuits are now reconsidering the
merits of corporate liability under the ATS after Kiobel. After Kiobel, a Second
Circuit case itself, was decided on extraterritoriality grounds—rather than
corporate liability, as the Second Circuit expressly expected—a circuit court
panel remanded Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL for a
district court to address the first instance of corporate liability questions.116
Two months later, a district court within the Second Circuit permitted parties

113 Compare Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2013) reh’g
denied, 10-1306-CV, 2013 WL 5700963 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2013) (remanded corporate liability issue for further
briefing), and Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2013 WL 6670945 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that
corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.”).
114 Federal courts, and not state, because the ATS expressly vests its jurisdiction in federal district courts.
§ 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
115 Mwani v. Laden, CIV.A. 99-125 JMF, 2013 WL 2325166 (D.D.C. 2013) (though immediately
certifying the issue for appeal to the D.C. Circuit due to its potential controversy and the novelty of Kiobel.)
Distinguished by Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, CIV. 10-483 RCL, 2013 WL 4427943
(D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing ATS claims for lack of touch and concern because attacks “allegedly funded by
Iran, launched from Lebanon, and targeted Israel” were not specifically targeted at Americans, though
Americans were undisputedly affected).
116 Licci, 732 F.3d at 174 (“[W]e predicted that should the Supreme Court affirm this Court’s opinion in
Kiobel . . . based on our conclusion in Kiobel that the ATS does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over
corporate defendants for violations of customary international law”).
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of In re S. African Apartheid Litigation to brief the matter of corporate
liability.117 Just a week before corporate liability briefs were solicited for In re
S. African Apartheid Litigation, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Kiobel to clearly
permit corporate liability. In the dicta of a December 2013 decision, the Ninth
Circuit suggested that corporations may be liable under the ATS so long as
presumption against extraterritorial application is overcome.118 Notably, that
same dicta cited decisions from two United Nations ad hoc tribunals for
authority on actus reus standards on aiding and abetting.119
As these three circuits display, neither corporate liability nor “touch and
concern” is likely to stay untouched for long. Courts are quickly wading into
the waters of Kiobel interpretation. The matter of interpreting CIL for the
purpose of the ATS, and likely other issues in turn, may soon be upon us.
When those or other ATS cases reach the U.S. Supreme Court, what CIL
framework will inform the court’s interpretation? As the legal community
watches to see if the Second, Ninth, and DC circuits’ pending ATS cases will
progress to the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the “touch and concern” and
corporate liability matters, a functional theory for CIL implementation will
prove equally necessary.120

117 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 02 MDL 1499 SAS, 2013 WL 6813877 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). According
to John Bellinger, In re S. African Apartheid Litig. is “the longest running of all major ATS cases.” John
Bellinger, More Kiobel Fall Out, LAWFARE, (Dec. 26, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/
more-kiobel-fall-out-foreign-defendants-dismissed-from-ats-apartheid-case-but-ford-and-ibm-remain-fornow/#.UsXZ7PaRuDU.
118 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2013 WL 6670945 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In light of intervening
developments in the law, we conclude that corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.”).
119 Id. at 5 (“[W]e grant plaintiff-appellants leave to amend their complaint in light of recent authority
regarding the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute and the actus reus standard for aiding and
abetting.”) citing Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A Judgment, ¶ 475 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013) (“[T]he actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is established by
assistance that has a substantial effect on the crimes, not the particular manner in which such assistance is
provided.”); Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A Judgment, ¶ 36 & n. 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (holding that “specific direction remains an element of the actus reus of
aiding and abetting,” while noting that “specific direction may be addressed implicitly in the context of
analysing substantial contribution”).
120 John Bellinger, Reflections on Kiobel, LAWFARE (Apr. 22, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.
com/2013/04/reflections-on-kiobel/. Bellinger, a former U.S. Legal Advisor, blogged his surprise that the
Supreme Court did not clearly define “touch and concern” in Kiobel. (“In their concurring opinion, Justices
Alito and Thomas go farther, stating that a claim under the ATS would be barred unless the domestic conduct
itself constitutes a violation of customary international law satisfying the requirements of Sosa. Personally, I
am surprised that, after two rounds of briefing and argument and with the knowledge that several ATS cases
remain on hold in Second, Ninth, and DC Circuits, the Court did not give clearer guidance to the lower courts
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D. The Way Forward Is Uncharted in the United States, But Not Elsewhere
The way forward is uncharted domestically not only because the Supreme
Court has thus far declined to chart a course and because CIL is subject to
change over time, but because at present, the best-known approaches are of a
polarized, insufficient variety.121 Potential solutions may be best assessed in
light of other federal nations’ broader experiences implementing CIL in state
and federal courts alike. Other nations, albeit through slightly different judicial
structures, far surpass the United States in CIL implementation and
engagement in state courts. At a time when American jurisprudence
concerning international law is in greater need for direction than the nation
may wish to admit, the matter of CIL implementation and engagement within a
federal structure is worth undertaking a comparative study. Kiobel means that
the U.S. needs an answer for the authority of CIL in its federal courts. Beyond
the Kiobel context for federal courts, Australian and Indian state court cases
indicate that the body of CIL stands to enrich a state court’s jurisdiction, even
if only for persuasive authority.
There is certainly a continuing role of CIL in determining the relationship
between nation states. If the United States does not find a way to work through
the application for CIL between American states, the nation will likely digress
to a Medellin debacle in time.122 Though Medellin dealt with treaty law rather
than CIL, the implications for damaging, unresolved conflicts between
American federalism and international law stand. The two bodies of law are
not as discreet as some may like. For example, the United States Department of
State publicly notes, “the United States considers many of the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary
international law on the law of treaties.”123 One may wonder which of the
provisions the United States does not consider constituting CIL, now codified
in a treaty, or how the United States picked and chose among them. The State
Department’s website does not seem to address that distinction.124
For those dismayed at the thought of varying interpretations of CIL within
the United States, consider the varying interpretations of CIL worldwide.
and may have left the door to future ATS litigation easily opened. It remains to be seen how the lower courts
interpret the phrase ‘touch and concern.’”).
121 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 167; see supra Part I.C.
122 See infra Part III.
123 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/
treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2013, 9:57 PM).
124 See id.
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There is a potential wonder in informing each other and bettering each other’s
understandings while accounting for a world made of varying backgrounds and
views that perhaps should not be made to forfeit any sense of identity for the
sake of a perhaps unnecessary precise world uniformity.125 As available
theories brought no resolution, let us look to fellow federal nations who are
moving forward in CIL engagement and implementation.
II. COMPARING THE INDIAN AND AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCES
This section will explain the selection of Australia and India for
comparative study, compare their federal disbursements of power with that of
the U.S., and then separately consider their federal and state precedents
implementing and engaging CIL. Ultimately, this section reveals that
Australian and Indian state and federal courts alike display a wide array of
seemingly nonpreemptive perspectives on CIL. Some courts deny any
domestic role for CIL, while others embrace it entirely; or acknowledge the
establishment of CIL on a certain matter, then assert that they lack authority to
enforce CIL either because that role should be left to another court, or even to
another branch of government. The comparative analysis reaches four
conclusions. In the combined Indian and Australian experiences engaging and
implementing CIL in state and federal courts, (1) harmoniously engaging
and/or implementing CIL in a federal nation’s state and federal courts is
possible; (2) the engagement and/or implementation of CIL in a federal context
does not require the extreme reach of the modernist or revisionist position; (3)
CIL enriches judicial decisions even when only engaged and not implemented;
and (4) CIL engagement requires a tailor-made approach for a given nation.
A. Why India and Australia? A Mutually Beneficial Give-and-Take for
Federal Nations Resolving the Status of CIL in Domestic Courts
Australia and India are presented alongside the United States for their
kindred experiences exploring the engagement of public international law
within federal frameworks. The three nations share a common bond of former
British colonization and exist as ongoing experiments in federal democracy.
The implementation of CIL can prove particularly challenging in federal
nations because their power is not conveniently centralized in a national
125

SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170 (interpreting CIL as nonpreemptive federal law “would allow
customary international law to develop in nonuniform ways in state and federal courts. The state and federal
courts could engage in a collaborative process of illumination.”).
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government that possesses authority to both outwardly make international
declarations of legal intent and to inwardly see to the implementation of such
declaration at state and local levels. India presents a unique federal perspective
in contrast to Australia and the United States because its constitution prescribes
a far more unitary government. Still, the nation is not immune to its federal
peers’ hurdles in implementing CIL.
While there exists no perfect comparison to the American experiment,
federal, non-European, former British colonies provide a respectable fit. In this
complementary regard, India, Australia and the United States share a bond
worthy of exploration.
In a similar fashion to their progressive enumeration of individual rights,126
the United States, Australia and India fall along a progressive scale of attention
to CIL in state and federal courts. Where the United States says little of CIL in
federal courts and next to nothing of CIL in state courts, save denying CIL
concerning post-conviction conditions for prisoners,127 Australia makes
sweeping statements about CIL in its highest federal court, and gives moderate
(though broad in scope) attention to CIL in state courts. India’s attention to
CIL exceeds the others, frequently and broadly addressing CIL in both its
highest national court and in its state courts.
While Australian and Indian federal and state courts seem to have much to
say about CIL, American state courts merely say that capital punishment,
solitary confinement and life without parole are not firmly established tenets of
CIL, and would not be binding domestic law even if they were CIL (Australian
state courts have an analogous persistent issue in genocide).128 Perhaps U.S.
state courts do not look to CIL because the monist versus dualist debate it so
polarized. Like it or not, America’s federal courts will likely be forced to
engage CIL at least in the context of future ATS litigation. But what of state
courts? As Australian and Indian courts demonstrate, CIL stands to enrich
American state court decisions.

126

See infra Part II.A.1.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory noted the United States’ departure
from European sentiments on this matter in Eastman v Chief Exec. of the Dep’t of Justice and Cmty. Safety
[2010] ACTSC 4 (12 January 2010) (“Although the concept of rehabilitation has profoundly shaped American
sentencing and correctional policies, a constitutional right to rehabilitation remains unrecognized by the United
States federal courts. In sharp contrast, a number of European nations include rehabilitation as a constitutional
mandate.”).
128 See infra Part II.B.2.
127
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1. Differences in Separations of Power
Before analyzing their legal precedent, the nations’ constitutional positions
on federalism and CIL must be explored. The nations’ varying separations of
powers are addressed here, and constitutional matters specific to CIL are
addressed in the Australian and Indian subsections. While all federal in
structure, the three former British colonies each boast unique government
identities. Where the United States is a representative democracy, Australia is a
constitutional monarchy and India is a constitutional republic.129 One academic
hypothesized that “the external environment in which courts operate is a
critical component in analyzing their resort to foreign law.”130 The same is
arguably true for courts’ relationship with CIL.
The United States Constitution is known for its limited central powers and
wide deference to states’ rights.131 Per international law implementation, the
Constitution is clear that treaties will reign supreme:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.132

While states are bound to self-executing treaties entered into by the
executive,133 the Constitution does not bind states’ obligations concerning
interpretation of CIL.134

129 SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW 27
(2001); GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 149 (2010).
130 Smith, supra note 10, at 232.
131 Ronald L. Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of
Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST. 769, 769 (1987).
132 U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
133 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“This Court has long recognized the distinction
between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—while they constitute
international law commitments—do not by themselves function as binding federal law. The distinction was
well explained by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, which held that a treaty is ‘equivalent
to an act of the legislature,’ and hence self-executing, when it ‘operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision.’) (internal citations omitted).
134 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 165 (“Without further action by authorized bodies in the United States,
such as state or federal legislatures, customary international law is not law that is binding in courts in the
United States. For the revisionists, customary international law simply does not constitute law in the United
States without some further authorizing act.”).
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Like the United States and India, Australia’s legal structure is in many
regards a product of its departure from British colonization. While the
Commonwealth became a federal system in 1900,135 and was legally
independent of the British in 1942, the states themselves only gained legal
independence in 1986.136 The government is now a constitutional monarchy
led by the Queen of England, known in this context as the Queen of Australia,
though her duties are largely performed by an appointed Australian leader
known as Governor-General.137 A referendum to cut that final tie from the
British failed almost unanimously in 1999.138 Most important for the topic at
hand, the Australian judiciary is legally independent of the British.139 The
Australian federal government is comprised of six states and two territories.
According to the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament and
the states share certain concurrent powers; the High Court of Australia has
ultimate authority concerning federal law, and Commonwealth law prevails in
the instance of inconsistent state legislation.140 A series of twentieth century
cases in the High Court trended toward greater centralization of
Commonwealth power over the states, though twenty-first century trends
appear bound toward a greater reestablishment of states’ rights.
Unlike the United States and Australia, India’s federalism features a greater
central bias.141 Less can be said that one form of federalism is superior than
that the nations simply achieved independence in markedly different eras of
world history and particularly of international relations.142 The Indian
135

DAVID CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC LAW 13 (2003).
JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 129, at 25–26 (Australia’s federal legal independence was finalized in
the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act of 1942, though adoption was backdated to 1939, synchronized with
the beginning of World War II).
137 Id. at 27.
138 Kathleen E. Foley, Australian Judicial Review, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 282, 284 n.30
(2007).
139 JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 129, at 27.
140 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51; s 71; s 109.
141 INDIA CONST., Chapter XI, § 256, 257:
136

The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws
made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and the executive power of
the Union shall extent to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the
Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. [§257 (1)] The executive power of every
State shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of
the Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a
State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.
Id.; see generally Rao & Singh, supra note 56.
142 See generally Rao & Singh, supra note 56.
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Constitution, for instance, is a product of its post-World War II heritage;
“infused with human rights protections more explicitly expansive than in any
prior compact.”143 Due at least in part to that intentional infusion, India boasts
the longest constitution on record.144
Two matters explain the Indian founders’ commitment to a more unitary
government. First, Indian leaders knew they needed to project a strong,
uniform voice into the international community as the nation came into its
own.145 Having uniquely held membership in the League of Nations long
before becoming an autonomous state,146 India’s leaders knew the crucial value
of public image as the country emerged independent. Second, where James
Madison advocated through the Federalist Papers for checks and balances
among government powers, undergirded by a belief in the depravity of man,
Indian leaders took a more positive view of society and conceptualized
government in a role of “benevolent guardian,” which naturally bent toward
centralization.147
Among Australia and the United States, India’s federalism is newest and is
a remarkable work in progress to this day.148 While the Indian constitution
appears to set up a tremendously unitary political system,149 constitutional
analysis alone leaves an insufficient and even misleading image of the reality
of India’s separation of powers. After the 1964 death of its first independent
democratic leader, Jawaharlal Nehru,150 India embarked upon a “federalizing
process” that incrementally continues to pass authority onto the states to this
day, though not yet so much so that the balance of power tips away from
143 Smith, supra note 10, at 238 (“Moreover, the Constitution was a true post-World War II document,
infused with human rights protections more explicitly expansive than in any prior compact. Part III of the
document reflects these aspirations, mimicking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.”).
144 Id.
145 Rao & Singh, supra note 56, at 7 (“[W]e are unanimously of the view that it would be injurious to the
interests of the country to provide for a weak central authority which could be incapable of ensuring peace, of
co-ordinating vital matters of common concern and of speaking effectively for the whole country in the
international sphere.”).
146 Stephen Legg, An International Anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations, and India’s Princely
Geographies, 43 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 96, 96 (2014) (“Thanks, in part, to its contribution of men and materiel
to the First World War, India secured a place at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, which (unexpectedly)
made it a founding member of the League of Nations.”); STEPHEN P. COHEN, INDIA: EMERGING POWER 2
(2001) (“India achieved its independence in 1947.”).
147 Rao & Singh, supra note 56, at 8.
148 COHEN, supra note 146, at 113.
149 Id. at 106.
150 Id. at 107.
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center.151 One academic characterizes India’s federal system as a “metastable
structure” in which “a federal revolution is real, but is grinning away
slowly.”152
B. The Australian Experience with CIL
However relatively small the precedent set may be, Australia’s experience
implementing and engaging CIL provides a rich array of perspectives from
which to draw. The High Court’s precedents include a promulgation of three
modes for CIL engagement, and a show-stopping question of whether courts
are even the appropriate governmental branch to consider the domestic role of
CIL. The breadth of CIL engagement in Australian state courts is remarkable,
ranging from one court denying its authority, as a state court, to implement
even the most absolutely binding form of CIL, jus cogens; to another declining
to include well-established CIL in grounds that the law simply was not
domestically binding; to another court recently noting that Australia was bound
to CIL as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, similar
to the passing nod given on the U.S. State Department’s website.153
1. Introduction to Australia
Despite being penned more than a century later than the United States
Constitution, when the body of CIL was more robust, the Australian
Constitution makes little mention of CIL.154 In fact, the Australian Constitution
is entirely silent on “the method of Australia’s entry into binding legal
relationships on the international stage, the legal effect of international law
within the domestic legal system, and the responsibility for enforcement of
such obligations at the domestic level.”155 The constitution does grant power to
address “external affairs” by enacting legislation to the federal parliament, and
grants original jurisdiction for treaty matters to the High Court.156 Procedures
for the interpretation and implementation of CIL are left unresolved.

151

Id. at 106.
Id. at 113.
153 See supra Part I.D.
154 Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order, 25 SYDNEY
L. REV. 423, 428 (2003).
155 Id.
156 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51(xxix); AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 75(i); Charlesworth et al.,
supra note 155, at 428.
152
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Early drafts of the Australian Constitution did pay greater attention to
international law, even containing a provision including treaties as a legal
source modeled after the United States’ Supremacy Clause.157 Ultimately, the
clause was removed because leaders felt that the measure “would be more in
place in the United States Constitution, where treaties are dealt with by the
President and the [S]enate, than in the constitution of a colony within an
empire.”158 No provision of the Australian Constitution directly addresses the
implementation of CIL.159 Not surprisingly, then, the debate between monists
and dualists is equally alive in Australia.160 However, where American CIL
precedent may be sparse, Australia has even less.161
2. Australian High Court Cases
When it comes to charting a course for the domestic application of CIL, the
Australian High Court is historically nearly as noncommittal as the United
States Supreme Court.162 Consider former Chief Justice Latham’s 1948
opinion in Chow Hung Ching v The King: “[international] law is not as such
part of the law of Australia . . . but a universally recognized principle of
international law would be applied by our courts.”163 In the same case, Justice
Starke’s opinion reiterated an earlier decision:
The Courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which
nations accept amongst themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to
ascertain what the relevant rule is, and, having found it, they will
treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not
inconsistent with rules enacted by statues or finally declared by their
tribunals.164

The Australian legal principles established in Chow Hung Ching appear
thoroughly explored in only two subsequent federal cases, Dietrich v The
157

Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 429.
Id. at 429, citing Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention (Sydney,
1897) at 240.
159 Henry Burmester, The Determination of Customary International Law in Australian Courts, 4 NONST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 39, 39 (2004).
160 Burmester & Reye, supra note 57, at 49.
161 See Meltzer, supra note 43, at 517 (asserting that CIL is not a major point of contention on the whole
of American jurisprudence); Smelcer, supra note 48, at 318 (asserting less case law on CIL in Australia than in
the United States).
162 See supra Part I.
163 Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 452 (citing Chung Chi Cheung v The King (1939) AC 160,
449).
164 Id. at 452 (citing Chung Chi Cheung v The King (1939) AC 160, 167–68).
158
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Queen before the Australian High Court and Nulyarimma v Thompson before
the Full Federal Court.165
In Dietrich v The Queen, in 1992, the Australian High Court considered
whether the right to government-sponsored counsel as articulated in the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, considered on its merits
as CIL because it was not implemented into Australian domestic law, could or
should be implemented as Australian common law.166 The Court unanimously
declined to incorporate CIL to establish an absolute right to counsel.167
Interpreting that the standing Australian common law right to fair trial may
include a right to fair counsel, however, the justices presented three distinct
declinations to incorporate the right.168 While three justices narrowly
interpreted that CIL was appropriate only for speaking into Australian common
law ambiguities,169 one justice wrote that CIL could inform both ambiguities
and clear gaps in the common law,170 and another wrote that CIL could inform
modifications or expansions to Australian common law subject to limits from
policy and a constitutional separation of powers.171 These three approaches
will recur in this Comment both in themes of Indian precedent and in the way
forward proposed by the conclusion.
Seven years later the Full Federal Court decided Nulyarimma v Thompson,
addressing whether there existed a peremptory norm of CIL prohibiting
genocide, and whether that norm was embraced by Australian law.172 The
matter of genocide prohibitions in CIL would go on to be raised in countless
federal courts and at least one state court throughout Australia.173 The majority
opinion pronounced a decided “no,” while one justice provided a nuanced
dissent.174 The majority opinion characterized domestic courts’ decisions
whether to implement CIL principles as policy issues, and that absent enacting
165 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292. See generally Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153;
Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 453.
166 Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 454.
167 See generally Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292.
168 Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 455.
169 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 Mason CJ, McHugh J and Dawson J 306.
170 Id., Toohey J 360–61.
171 Id., Brennan J 318–21.
172 Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153 para 18.
173 In the Federal Court of Australia, see generally SRYYY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs, 147 FCR 1 (2005); SZITR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2006]
FCA 1759. In the Supreme Court of South Australia, see Thorpe v Kennett [1999] VSC 422 (15 November
1999) para 30.
174 Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153; Charlesworth et al., supra note 154, at 455.
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legislation, implementation should always be avoided in criminal matters.175
The majority openly noted that such a perspective lacked significant
precedent.176 A concurrence in judgment noted that criminal offenses of CIL
could not be incorporated into Australian law because the nation’s Criminal
Code abolished all common law crimes from Commonwealth law.177 An artful
dissent provided fodder for thought, theorizing that CIL principles should be
domestically implemented unless found in conflict with domestic law, in which
case the custom could only enter domestic law through implementing
legislation.178 These drastically disparate theories of CIL implementation
would not be resolved any time soon.
In 2002, the High Court addressed the domestic implementation of CIL in
two cases in nearly opposite fashion.179 The High Court held in Western
Australia v Ward that “[t]here is no requirement for the common law to
develop in accordance with international law,” denouncing the prospect as
“unacceptable.”180 With a fascinating rhetoric seeming to draw upon a
promissory estoppel theory, the Court articulated what is perhaps the strongest
argument against courts as the proper forum for bringing CIL into domestic
law.
The proposition that international law—itself often vague and
conflicting—demands that the common law of Australia be moulded
in a particular way, apparently without regard for precedent, the
conditions in this country, or the fact that governments and
individuals may have reasonably relied on the law as it stands is
unacceptable.181

Western Australia v Ward left open for discussion a fair issue for discussion in
any federal nation—whether the appropriate place to consider ushering CIL
into domestic law is federal legislatures. Months later, the High Court’s Dow
Jones v Gutnick decision provided a striking whiplash in a matter of months,
holding that all developments of Australian common law concerning the
175

Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153, para 164; Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 455.
Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153, para 164; Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 455.
177 Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153, para 172; Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 456.
178 Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153, para 190; Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 456
(“The approach of Merkel J to the integration of customary international law differed from that of his judicial
colleagues in that his Honour’s approach relied neither on broad judicial consideration of policy . . . nor on the
narrow requirement for express parliamentary approval of the relevant principle.”).
179 Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 457.
180 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1, para 958.
181 Id. at para 958.
176
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“digital millennium” fall in line with CIL as embodied in the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.182
In sum, Australia’s highest federal courts are wary to incorporate CIL into
their domestic common law. While considering the following Australian state
cases, and Indian cases as well, readers should return to the three CIL
incorporation possibilities proposed within Dietrich: employing CIL to speak
into ambiguities in common law,183 to inform both ambiguities and clear gaps
in common law,184 or to inform expansions and modifications upon common
law.185 The Western Australia question remains a valid one: are courts the best
forums in which to bring international law of any kind into the fold of
domestic law? Australian state courts provide excellent estuaries for such
considerations.
3. Australian State Court Cases
More so than Australia’s High Court or Full Federal Court, Australian state
courts have everything in the world to say about CIL—what qualifies, what
does not, what may be in the process of becoming CIL (known as the
“crystallizing” period), and what authority it holds domestically. Section 73 of
Australia’s constitution grants the High Court of Australia nonexclusive
appellate review over the state superior courts.186 Section 109 establishes
supremacy of Commonwealth law over state law.187 The state courts enjoy
substantial opportunities to establish common law, despite the High Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, because appeal is not automatic. Those wishing to
appeal decisions from a state supreme court (whether the Full Court; the Court
of Appeal, a portion of state supreme court justices sitting in review of a civil
matter; or the Court of Criminal Appeal, a portion of state supreme court
justices sitting in review of a criminal matter), must apply for special leave to

182

Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 194 ALR 433, 116; Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 457.
Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 Mason CJ, McHugh J and Dawson J 306.
184 Id., Toohey J 360–61.
185 Id., Brennan J 318–21.
186 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) s 73; Foley, supra note 138, at 290 (“As a
preliminary issue, in Australia, the power of judicial review does not reside exclusively with the High Court.
Instead, lower courts also possess and exercise the power to decide constitutional questions. However, the
High Court is the focus of attention regarding judicial review because it stands at the apex of Australia’s
judicial system, deciding the most important constitutional cases.”).
187 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) s 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
invalid.”).
183
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do so. Special leave petitions are granted in only about 20 percent of
instances.188
Australia is comprised of six states and ten territories, three of which
maintain supreme courts equal in authority to those of the states due to sizable
populations.189 In the past twenty to thirty years’ decisions from Australia’s
nine state and territory supreme courts,190 five courts decided multiple cases
concerning CIL.191 A search of the other four courts’ records produced no
cases on point. Of the pertinent five courts, each decided two CIL-related
cases.192
In 2001, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory interpreted the right
of asylum as one of state and not of individuals under CIL in The Queen v
Husen Baco & Others, citing an Australian High Court precedent interpreting
the same.193 The same court earlier decided Fa v Morris, an international
fishing case concerning fishery conservation zones.194 The court agreed with
the respondent’s assertion that a 200 nautical mile fishing zone was “well
established in customary international law,” and explored multiple legal
commentaries’ theories that a 200-mile fishery conservation zone was “in the

188 David Malcolm, State Supreme Courts, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF
AUSTRALIA (Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield & George Williams eds., 2007 online edition), available at
Oxford Reference.
189 State and Territory Government, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/
our-government/state-and-territory-government (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
190 Varying by records available from the Australasian Legal Information Institute, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au. The Institute’s records extend as follows: the Australian Capital Territory, 1986
forward; New South Wales: 1993 forward; Norfolk Island, 1984 forward; the Northern Territory, 1986
forward; Queensland, 1994 forward; South Australia, 1989 forward; Tasmania, 1985 forward; Victoria, 1994
forward; Western Australia, 1996 forward.
191 Through searches of the Australasian Legal Information Institute website, no pertinent cases were
found in the supreme court records of Western Australia, Norfolk Island, Tasmania, or Queensland.
192 Those courts are the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, the Supreme Court of New
South Wales, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, the Supreme Court of South Australia, and the
Supreme Court of Victoria. No cases concerning CIL were found in the recent records of the supreme courts of
Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, or Norfolk Island.
193 The Queen v Husen Baco & Ors [2011] NTSC 75 (28 September 2011) para 17 (“[C]ustomary
international law deals with the right of asylum as a right of states not of individuals; individuals, including
those seeking asylum, may not assert a right under customary international law to enter the territory of a State
of which that individual is not a national”), citing Minister for Immigration v Ibrahim, [2000] HCA 55; (2000)
204 CLR 1 para 137 available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2000/55.html (“[I]t has long
been recognised that, according to customary international law, the right of asylum is a right of States not of
the individual”).
194 Fa v Morris [1987] NTSC 20; 46 NTR 1; 87 FLR 36; 27 A Crim R 342 (8 May 1987).
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process of crystallizing as a principle of customary international law.”195 The
court also looked to commentary asserting the establishment of CIL in light of
other nations’ practices.196
In 1999, the Supreme Court of South Australia denied Australian state
courts’ authority to implement CIL domestically, at least in the form of
creating new crimes. In Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Others, the court explained, “The courts of the States and the Territories can
have no authority for themselves to proscribe conduct as criminal under the
common law simply because it has now become recognised as an international
crime with the status of jus cogens under customary international law.”197 Jus
cogens norms are peremptory, nonderogable principles of “supercustom” out
of which no state can contract, even by treaty.198
That same year, Supreme Court of Victoria handled the Australian state
courts’ repeated CIL matter, genocide. The Court acknowledged not only that
genocide was a crime of CIL, but that it had been since 1948 at the latest, when
the crime was defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.199 Still, the Court held firm: “that
ratification did not have the effect of incorporating the Act as part of
Australian law or for that matter as part of Victorian Law.”200 Likewise, in
2000, the Supreme Court of South Australia declined to incorporate the
criminalization of genocide into domestic common law in Thorpe v Kennett,
even as the court accepted that the prohibition of genocide is both a
“peremptory norm of customary international law” and “part . . . of Australia’s
treaty obligations to other nation States.”201 Again, the court pointed to
decisions from Australia’s highest court that expressly held that “the offence of
genocide is not recognized by Australian domestic law,” no matter its
195 Id. at para 142 (“Clearly the fishery conservation zone, not greater than 200 miles from the usual
baselines, is in the process of crystallizing as a principle of customary international law”); also citing IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1979, 3d ed.).
196 Fa v Morris [1987] NTSC 20; 46 NTR 1; 87 FLR 36; 27 A Crim R 342 (8 May 1987) citing K.W.
RYAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 377 (1984) (“While no provision has been made in international
treaty for a 200 mile fisheries zone this zone may be regarded as having been established under customary
international law in the light of claims of a vast number of maritime nations including the United States,
Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, European Economic Community and the countries of the third world.”).
197 Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors, No. SCGRG-99-1257 Judgment No. S456 [1999]
SASC 456 (27 October 1999) paras 31–32.
198 BEDERMAN, supra note 27, at 39.
199 Thorpe v Kennett [1999] VSC 422 (15 November 1999) para 30.
200 Id. at para 30.
201 Sumner, SASC 91 at para 17.
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establishment as CIL.202 The court interpreted outside sources and a series of
higher court decisions as giving one uniform message: “customary
international law [is] a potential source of Australian common law but not an
automatic part of it.”203
In both its CIL cases, the Supreme Court of New South Wales safely
engaged federal court interpretations of CIL rather than resting on its own
interpretation. In 1997, in Kotsambasis v Singapore Airlines, the court looked
to CIL for interpreting international conventions.204 Later, in 2008, the Court
looked to a federal court precedent, which assessed CIL by state practice, also
considering jus cogens to conclude that Australia’s Foreign States Immunities
Act provides immunities to foreign government officers.205
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Victoria made a seeming about-face from a
long line of state court precedents herein noted which denied Australia to be
bound by CIL. In ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice & Anor, the Court
nearly whispered in a footnote: “the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
is understood to represent a codification of existing customary international
law, which also binds Australia.”206, 207 On its face, this ruling cannot be
harmonized with the Supreme Court of South Australia’s Thorpe decision that
even “peremptory norm[s]” of CIL are not automatic domestic common law.208
Need the two harmonize? Perhaps federalism says “no.”

202 Id. at para 32, citing Nulyarimma v Thompson [1999] FCA 1192 para 32; Sumner v United Kingdom of
Great Britain [1999] SASC 462, para 17. (“Each of the judges in Nulyarimma engage in a detailed exploration
of the international law pertaining to the crime of genocide and its relationship with Australian law, and made
it clear that, in the absence of legislation, a prohibition against genocide is not cognisable under Australian
law.”).
203 Sumner, SASC 91 at para 30.
204 See generally Kotsambasis v Singapore Airlines Ltd Matter [1997] NSWSC 303.
205 Zhang v Zemin & Ors. [2008] NSWSC 1296 (14 November 2008) at para 39 (“there is no principle of
customary international law which provides an exception from state immunity where an act of torture has been
committed outside the forum, even for acts contrary to jus cogens”).
206 Contra Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm) (the U.S. Department of State contends that only some of the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are binding upon the nation as CIL); see supra Part I.D.
207 ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice & Anor [2013] VSC 267 (22 May 2013), n.35 (the fuller quote:
“Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties limits its temporal application to treaties enacted
after 1980 (when it entered into force). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into
force in 1976. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is understood to represent a
codification of existing customary international law, which also binds Australia: Fisheries Jurisdiction (United
Kingdom v Iceland) (Jurisdiction) [1973] ICJ Rep 3, 19; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)
(Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 38, 62.”).
208 Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors. [2000] SASC 91 (13 April 2000) para 17.
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Australian state courts display circumspect reflections upon the domestic
engagement and implementation of CIL. Where the Supreme Court of South
Australia was relatively dismissive, finding no authority to implement CIL to
establish a crime not previously recognized in the domestic jurisdiction, even if
perceived internationally as holding the binding authority of jus cogens,209 the
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory actively sought out principles of CIL
to consider domestic issues. The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory
engaged three points of CIL in three unique manners; interpreting asylum as
not an individual right under CIL,210 fishing zones as well-established CIL, and
fishing conversation zones as in the continuing process of becoming CIL.211
4. Conclusions on the Australian Experience
The whole of Australia’s CIL jurisprudence demonstrates rich discussions
that are arguably all the richer for not being bound to each other. On the
broader theme of CIL engagement in federal nations, the Australian experience
demonstrates four truths.
First, harmoniously engaging and/or implementing CIL in a federal
nation’s state and federal courts is possible. The Australian experience
celebrates what dynamic perspective federalism can bring to the interpretation
of something as broad and relatively unbounded as CIL. Where half the
Australian state court decisions aimed to defer to federal interpretations of
CIL, others looked to international commentaries,212 or made relatively
independent interpretations in light of what they observed in other nations’
courts.213

209

Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors [1999] SASC 456, para 31–32.
The Queen v Husen Baco & Ors [2011] NTSC 75 , para 14 (“customary international law deals with
the right of asylum as a right of states not of individuals; individuals, including those seeking asylum, may not
assert a right under customary international law to enter the territory of a State of which that individual is not a
national”), citing Minister for Immigration v Ibrahim, [2000] HCA 55; (2000) 204 CLR 1, para 137 (“it has
long been recognised that, according to customary international law, the right of asylum is a right of States not
of the individual”).
211 Fa v Morris [1987] NTSC 20; 46 NTR 1; 87 FLR 36; 27 A Crim R 342 (“Clearly the fishery
conservation zone, not greater than 200 miles from the usual baselines, is in the process of crystallizing as a
principle of customary international law”); citing BROWNLIE, supra note 196, at 219.
212 Fa v Morris [1987] NTSC 20.
213 Id. citing RYAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 377 (1984) (“While no provision has been made
in international treaty for a 200 mile fisheries zone this zone may be regarded as having been established under
customary international law in the light of claims of a vast number of maritime nations including the United
States, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, European Economic Community and the countries of the third
world.”).
210
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Second, the engagement and/or implementation of CIL in a federal context
does not require the extreme reach of the modernist or revisionist position.
Given the choice, half the Australian state court decisions mentioned here
deferred to higher federal court rulings on CIL.214 The state courts hardly
thumbed their noses at the federal judiciary, as some monists believe state
courts may if given the choice.215 But again, need state courts harmonize?
Federalism does not require it. For any large, diverse nation, a variety of
interpretations seems inevitable and appropriate. As American revisionists
argue that no CIL is binding unless legislated, and American modernists assert
that international law is already U.S. law, Australian precedent presents a less
polarized possibility for implementing and engaging CIL. While Dean Robert
Schapiro’s more moderate polyphonic federalist theory advocates conceiving
of CIL as nonpreemptive federal law,216 some Australian courts do not
perceive CIL as federal law at all. To that end, why would each state not be
permitted to interpret the matter as they wish? The Australian High Court
could always grant appeal, if sought, to sort out any state court interpretation of
CIL with which the High Court took issue.
Third, CIL enriches judicial decisions even when only engaged and not
implemented. Consider the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory’s three
uses in two cases alone, and the three methods of CIL engagement proposed in
the Australian High Court’s Dietrich decision. Indeed, given all that can be
taken from the Australian CIL precedents, perhaps federalism as an institution
stands to offer more to CIL than it could begin to receive.
Finally, CIL engagement requires a tailor-made approach for a given
nation. Australian courts made no bones of approaching CIL in a uniquely
Australian manner, no matter the outside world’s perceptions of CIL’s
preeminence. The Supreme Court of South Australia denied state courts’

214 See Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors [2000] SASC 91, para 17; Zhang v Zemin &
Ors. [2008] NSWSC 1296, para 39 (“[T]here is no principle of customary international law which provides an
exception from state immunity where an act of torture has been committed outside the forum, even for acts
contrary to jus cogens.”) (citing Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran [2002] 124 ILR 428, para 63); see
generally Kotsambasis v Singapore Airlines Ltd [1997] NSWSC 303; The Queen v Husen Baco & Ors [2011]
NTSC 75, para 17 (“customary international law deals with the right of asylum as a right of states not of
individuals; individuals, including those seeking asylum, may not assert a right under customary international
law to enter the territory of a State of which that individual is not a national”) (citing Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim, [2000] HCA 55, para 137 (“it has long been recognised that, according
to customary international law, the right of asylum is a right of States not of the individual”)).
215 Young, supra note 85, at 479.
216 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170.
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authority to establish new crimes.217 Even among the three relationships
between CIL and Australian law offered in Dietrich, none called for CIL to
override domestic law at any point. The closest ever suggested was for CIL to
inform expansions and modifications upon common law.218 Still, Australian
common law was always the watermark.219
C. The Indian Experience with CIL
India is the third of three nations studied in this Comment to resist blanket
domestic enforcement of CIL in state and federal courts alike. Perhaps this
trend confirms that at least some American tendencies to resist CIL are not as
unique to the United States as some would contend. That premise established,
the idiosyncrasy may be easier perceived as one of function rather than elitism.
1. Introduction to India
Within a more centralized federal framework, the implementation of CIL
does not appear problematic. Like America and Australia, India follows a
dualist approach to the implementation of CIL.220 In 1997, in concert with the
yet-written Australian dissent in Nulyarimma v Thompson,221 the Indian
Supreme Court seemed to embrace the domestic incorporation of customary
international law principles not in conflict with municipal law. The majority
opinion in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India stated, “[i]t is
almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of customary international
law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to be
incorporated in the domestic law.”222 “Almost” leaves much unsaid, though
India’s state courts would negate the uncertainty in time.
Indian state court precedent will demonstrate a wide array of approaches to
CIL. Some states meld reliance upon CIL and foreign law, while others
interpret where CIL does and does not exist, let alone when it applies in state

217

See generally Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ors [1999] SASC 456.
Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 Brennan J 318–21.
219 See id., Brennan J 318–21, Toohey J 360–61, Mason CJ, McHugh J & Dawson J.
220 Smith, supra note 10, at 243 n.126 (“Regarding international conventional or treaty law, India
subscribes to the dualist position; such agreements have no binding effect unless implemented by legislation.
The [Indian] Supreme Court reiterated this position in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin (1980) 2
S.C.C. 360.”).
221 See supra Part II.B.ii.
222 People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568, para.
23.
218
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court. Some rely upon India Supreme Court precedent to interpret CIL, while
others look to the precedent of fellow state courts. One thought-provoking
canon proposal leaves fascinating questions for application in an American
context.
2. India Supreme Court Cases
In 1984, the India Supreme Court decided Gramophone Co. v. Birendra
Bahadur Pandey, in which the justices considered “whether international law
is, of its own force, drawn into the law of the land without the aid of a
municipal statute [and] whether, so drawn, it overrides municipal law in case
of conflict.”223 The Court resolved that municipal, national, and international
law should abide in harmony as much as possible; though when conflict arises
between the former two and the latter, “[n]ational courts being organs of the
national state and not organs of international law must perforce apply national
law if international law conflicts with it.”224 When municipal law allowed
room for interpretation, the Supreme Court called for interpretation in comity
with international law; it then re-emphasized that international law “must
yield . . . if conflict is inevitable.”225
In 1996, the India Supreme Court decided another case that would go on to
be cited by state courts throughout the nation. Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum
v. Union of India, an environmental law decision, established that the principle
of “sustainable development” was “accepted as a part of the [c]ustomary
[i]nternational [l]aw.”226 More importantly, the court went on to note, “[i]t is
almost [an] accepted proposition of law that the rule [sic] of [c]ustomary
[i]nternational [l]aw which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be
deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall be followed
by the Courts of Law.”227 Like its Australian counterpart, the India Supreme
Court expressed deference to CIL only to the degree that Indian law remained
untouched.

223 Gramophone Co. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667, 665 (The case also considered
“whether there is any well established rule of international law on the question of the right of land-locked
states to innocent passage of the goods across the soil of another state; and [] what is the meaning of the word
‘import’ used in s.53 of the Copyright Act.”).
224 Id. at 666.
225 Id. at 666.
226 Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2715. At that time, “sustainable
development” was loosely defined “as a balancing concept between eclogy [sic] and development.” Id.
227 Id.
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That same year, the India Supreme Court decided People’s Union of Civil
Liberties v. Union of India (“PUCL”). The Court addressed citizens’ rights to
privacy from telephone tapping. Ultimately finding that Indian citizens
generally possessed an unenumerated liberty from phone tapping derived from
the constitutional right to privacy asserted in the spirit of a number of legal
instruments, the Court drew support from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, without
exceeding the parameters of standing domestic law.228 Closely paraphrasing
Vellore, decided just a few months prior, the Court reiterated that the de facto
incorporation of CIL not in conflict with municipal law was “almost an
accepted proposition.”229 India’s high courts would test the bounds of
“almost.”
3. India High Court Cases
The decisions of Indian state courts, known as “high courts,” provide a rich
engagement of CIL that is worthy of attention. First, though, must come a
concession that Indian state courts possess less discretion for avoiding the
matter than Australian or American courts. The Indian system on the whole,
developed from a body already in motion during British occupation, is far
more unitary than either Australia or America.230 India has no federal district
or appellate courts.231 All matters originate in magistrate or state district
courts.232 Per the Indian constitution, ironically, district court judges are
appointed by the state high courts and not by any federal authority.233

228 People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568, paras.
21–24; BASANT LAL WADEHRA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK, WITH MODEL PIL FORMATS 362
(2009).
229 People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568, para.
23. The court further expounded, “International law today is not confined to regulating the relations between
the States. Scope continues to extend. Today matters of social concern, such as health, education and
economics apart from human rights fall within the ambit of International Regulations. International law is
more than ever aimed at individuals.” Id. at para. 22.
230 The relatively unitary government structure crafted by India’s founding fathers can largely be traced to
the likes of Jawaharlal Nehru and Bhimrao Ambedkar perceiving government as a “benevolent guardian,”
where American founding fathers such as James Madison saw inevitable government leaders, mere men, as
fallen creatures in need of constraint. Ghandi, incidentally, advocated a far less centralized nation. See
generally Rao & Singh, supra note 56.
231 Indian Court Structure, S.S. RANNA & CO., available at http://www.ssrana.in/intellectual%20property/
IP-Enforcement-And-Litigation/IP-IndianCourtsStructure.aspx (chart illustrating Indian court structure).
232 Id.
233 INDIA CONST. art. 233.
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A sampling of Indian state court decisions discussing CIL presents state
courts interpreting and implementing CIL based on their own study, the
persuasion of other state courts, the India Supreme Court, and even a variety of
other nations’ practices.234
The Delhi High Court may provide the strongest showing, as it has
addressed everything from diplomatic immunity to international drug
trafficking charges. In 1970 the Court held that a diplomat’s wife had
diplomatic immunity from legal proceedings concerning a car accident that she
caused, finding that spouses possess diplomatic immunity under CIL.235 Unlike
other high courts’ decisions, the Delhi High Court reached this finding without
looking to, or at least expressly citing to, any India Supreme Court cases on the
matter. Instead, the court looked to British and American conceptions of
domestic implementation of CIL,236 and asserted that even the state court was
obliged to adhere to the federal government’s commitment to the international
community through signing on to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.237 Another case set aside an international drug trafficking conviction
because, among other reasons, while India was a signatory to the United
Nations Conventions Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, that international obligation had no municipal force of law because
there were no codified provisions specific to the crime at hand.238 In another
sovereign immunity matter, the Delhi High Court considered “whether the
principles of [i]nternational [l]aw as transformed from time to time about
sovereign immunity apply in India in face of the provisions contained in
Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”239 In an open willingness to
consider how other jurisdictions addressed the matter, the Court considered
how the issue was addressed in courts in the United States, Britain, Italy,
234 Notably, each high court is named for the city in which it sits rather than the state over which it
governs. Indian high court decisions are not readily available through published reporters or the courts’ own
websites. An independent site, Kanoon, provides decisions for seven high courts. Searches on Kanoon for
cases mentioning “customary international law” in January 2014 produced 27 results: Andhra Pradesh (3),
Bombay (3), Calcutta (2), Delhi (5), Kerala (3), Madras (10), and Rajasthan (1).
235 Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. L.V. Kumar, 8 (1972) D.L.T. 32, available at http://indiankanoon.org/
doc/984520/.
236 Id. at paras. 9, 10.
237 Id. at para. 12.
238 Emma Charlotte Eve v. Narcotic Control Bureau, 2000 VAD Delhi 65 at paras. 11, 14 available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/867727/. (“In the absence of there being any specific provisions in the [General
Provisions] Act for dealing with an operation relating to controlled delivery, the provisions of 1998 U.N.
Conventions relating to the concept of controlled delivery cannot have the force of law.”).
239 Deepak Wadhwa v. Aeroflot, 24 (1983) D.L.T. 1, para. 1, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/
1693084/.
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Belgium and France in one paragraph alone.240 The Court, however, held that
India would resolve the matter by statute, and that “transformed principles of
international law” do not inform the matter.
Three cases from the Kerala High Court also display a diverse set of
approaches to CIL. In 1960, the Court defined CIL by what it did not reach,
holding that the CIL right of innocent passage exists only along coasts, and
does not extend to states’ territorial jurisdiction over ships anchored at their
ports.241 Despite not yet being fully defined, the Kerala High Court had “no
hesitation in holding that ‘Sustainable Development’ as a balancing concept
between ecology and development has been accepted as a part of the
customary international law” (and, as such, part of municipal law) in 2004,
citing the India Supreme Court’s Vellore decision.242 And in 2007, the Court
explained that a Petitioner’s “right to remove ordinary earth”243 was fettered by
the general Indian peoples’ constitutional right to a pollution-free environment,
explaining that Vellore mandated that the “Sustainable Development” principle
of CIL under municipal law.244
In 2000, the Madras High Court pronounced a canon of municipal law
interpretation in Tamil Nadu: “[i]f . . . two constructions of the municipal law
are permissible, the Courts should lean in favour of adopting such construction
as would make the provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony with the
international law or treaty obligations.”245 This philosophy, in particular,
would be radically transformative in the American context. Any proponent of
an ounce of states’ rights would give pause here: the state government now
bound to interpret its municipal laws in light of the federal government’s
international obligations likely had no say whatsoever in deciding to obligate
itself to whatever treaty may be at play.246 Still, a mere canon allows courts the

240

Id. at para. 7.
Bernardo Steenholf Ultrich v. Assistant Collector Of Customs, A.I.R. 1960 (Ker.) 335, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/729409/.
242 Soman v. Geologist, 2004 (3) K.L.T. 577, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/14406/.
243 That is, to remove dirt from land that he owned in order to sell it to others. Thilakan v. Circle Inspector
of Police, Cherpu Police Station and Others, A.I.R. 2008 Ker. 48, 2007 (3) K.L.J. 509 at paras. 1, 2, available
at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1000673/.
244 Id. at para. 17.
245 Tamil Nadu Tamil & English Schools v. Tamil Nadu, 2000 (2) C.T.C. 344, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/261579/.
246 The thought of such a precedent undoubtedly leaves Medellin v. Texas coming to international legal
scholar’s minds, and with good reason.
241
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room to interpret any municipal law as clear on its face and without need of
interpretation.
Ten years later, the Madras High Court cited Tamil Nadu’s landmark canon
and also considered two U.S. Supreme Court precedents in deciding whether
the Uniform System of School Education Act interfered with children and
parents’ rights to determine the best education available to them, and with
teachers’ freedom for inventiveness.247 In the one case in which the Rajasthan
High Court appeared to engage CIL, decided in 2013, the state court cited
another state court’s implementation of the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, also looking to the India Supreme Court’s implementation of
CIL in PUCL.248 A bounty of other cases incorporated India Supreme Court
precedents already discussed in this comment, including Vellore249 and
PUCL.250
4. Conclusions on the Indian Experience
The Indian experience is undeniably unique, both in its relatively unitary
judicial structure and in its courts’ independent take on matters of CIL. Still,
the same four truths of CIL engagement and implementation are visible in the
Indian experience as in the Australian experience.
First, harmoniously engaging and/or implementing CIL in a federal
nation’s state and federal courts is possible. Yet again, a federal nation’s
interaction with CIL does not appear to be an all-or-nothing stake. State courts
looked both to the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of CIL as well as to
each other’s interpretations.251

247 Krishnagiri District Private Schools’ Association v. Tamil Nadu, at para. 36, available at http://www.
indiankanoon.org/doc/1287559/ (citing Epperson v. State of Ark., 21 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968), and Scopes v.
State, 154 Tenn. 105 (1927)).
248 Mr. Mahesh Bora, Senior Advocate v. Unknown, S.B. C.R. Misc. Bail Application No. 8609,
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/167591344/.
249 Bombay Environmental Action v. Maharashtra, 2005 (6) (Bom.) C.R. 574, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1724514/.
250 See Ukraine v. Md. Shafique Khan, 2005 (3) (Chn.) 203, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/
753970/.
251 Mr. Mahesh Bora, Senior Advocate v. Unknown, S.B. C.R. Misc. Bail Application No. 8609,
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/167591344/, citing both the Indian Supreme Court’s CIL
interpretation as well as that of a fellow state high court; see also Thilakan at para. 17 (citing the Indian
Supreme Court).
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Second, the engagement and/or implementation of CIL in a federal context
does not require the extreme reach of the modernist or revisionist position. A
bounty of Indian high courts looked to the guidance of the India Supreme
Court’s CIL interpretations. Not every state court did in every case. Again,
high courts sometimes looked to each other.252 But without a “one law”
employment, as monists would require, or domestic legislation, as revisionists
would aspire to see, CIL was actively considered for its merits throughout a
federal nation’s state and federal courts alike.
Third, CIL enriches judicial decisions even when only engaged and not
implemented. Similar to the Australian experience, Indian courts consider CIL
from a variety of perspectives, even when only anecdotally and not for the
purpose of binding a given jurisdiction to CIL principles.
Finally, CIL engagement requires a tailor-made approach for any federal
nation. Indian courts routinely returned to what could build upon or enrich
domestic law. The compromise of domestic common law was never
considered. The Madras High Court’s canon of interpretation proposal in Tamil
Nadu well illustrates this point.253 CIL may be considered as well-worth Indian
consideration, but never to the detriment of domestic common law. India’s
engagement of CIL requires a keen deference to the nation’s laws. The Madras
canon will be further explored in Part III.
D. Comparative Analysis Conclusions
Indian and Australian experiences demonstrate the same four truths
concerning federal nations engaging CIL. In reflecting upon what is common
to India and Australia, perhaps some of their commonalities can be surmised as
generally true for federal nations.
1. Harmoniously Engaging and/or Implementing CIL in a Federal Nation’s
State and Federal Courts is Possible
Australia and India demonstrate that harmony is possible not only within a
federal nation’s state and federal courts, but among nations. One Indian high

252 Mr. Mahesh Bora, Senior Advocate v. Unknown, S.B. C.R. Misc. Bail Application No. 8609,
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/167591344/. Citing both the Indian Supreme Court’s CIL
interpretation as well as that of a fellow state high court.
253 Tamil Nadu Tamil & English Schools v. Tamil Nadu, (2000) (2) C.T.C. 344, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/261579/.
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court cited multiple U.S. Supreme Court precedents in engaging CIL, 254 and
one Australian court cited a variety of other nations’ interpretations of CIL.255
These findings fall in line with Judith Resnik’s assertions on foreign law
importation:
States and localities—through city councils, state legislatures,
national organizations of local officials, and courts—serve as both
importers and exporters of law. The conceit that United States law is
basically bounded is inaccurate. Rather, laws (like people) migrate,
and seepage is everywhere. The courts are only one stop along the
way.256

Interpretations of CIL find their way between even seemingly disparate
jurisdictions, and seem to play a positive role of sharpening each other’s views,
much as Robert Schapiro suggests their potential to do so.257 As Resnik further
notes, “once these multiple ports of entry come into view, so do questions
about the legality and desirability of various modes of action by a range of
actors (judges, legislatures, and the executive, both national and local).”258 A
more elaborate analysis of this point, relative to CIL, may need to account for
potential actors outside court systems.
2. The Engagement and/or Implementation of CIL in a Federal Context
Does Not Require the Extreme Reach of the Modernist or Revisionist
Position
Both nations’ courts navigated the engagement and interpretation of CIL
without resorting to mandating that the entire nation interpret CIL in a uniform
manner, or mandating that any bit of potential CIL be fleshed out in legislation
before being considered by a state court.
254 Krishnagiri Dist. Private Schools’ Ass’n v. Tamil Nadu, at para. 36 (India), available at
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1287559/; citing Epperson v. State of Ark., 21 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1968), and
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105 (1927).
255 Fa v Morris [1987] NTSC 20; 46 NTR 1; 87 FLR 36; 27 A Crim R 342 (8 May 1987) (Austl.) citing
K.W. RYAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 377 (1984) (“While no provision has been made in
international treaty for a 200 mile fisheries zone this zone may be regarded as having been established under
customary international law in the light of claims of a vast number of maritime nations including the United
States, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, European Economic Community and the countries of the third
world.”).
256 Resnik, supra note 21, at 1576.
257 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 168 (“As with other kinds of laws, the participation of multiple
interpreters could illuminate the range of possible meanings. The various courts could benefit from reviewing
the understandings of other tribunals.”).
258 Resnik, supra note 21, at 1579.
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3. CIL Enriches Judicial Decisions even when only Engaged and Not
Implemented
The Kerala High Court and the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory
each considered CIL in three manners within their respective precedents.259
The Australia High Court, too, offered three perspectives on how CIL could be
engaged within the nation’s jurisprudence in Dietrich. Even such ruminating
on matters of CIL undoubtedly enriches the breadth and depth of judicial
consideration. Again, the potential of polyphonic federalism that Schapiro
projects for the United States seems already apparent in India and Australia.260
4. CIL Engagement Requires a Tailor-Made Approach for any Federal
Nation
Australian and Indian engagement of CIL requires a keen deference to the
nations’ domestic common laws. The policy behind such deference for federal
nations may be best illustrated in the promissory estoppel theory espoused by
the Australian High Court in Western Australia v Ward.261 When deciding
within a given jurisdiction, officers of a court are engaging parties,
governments and individuals alike, who likely “reasonably relied on the law as
it stands.”262 Further, to change the law otherwise would both disregard
judicial precedent and compromise constitutionally designated legislative
power.263
That same decision made an obvious (though seemingly rarely articulated)
observation of international law on the whole that is particularly true of CIL
and may also well explain the need for general deference to domestic common
law: “international law [is] itself often vague and conflicting.”264 The one
method never seen in a single Australian or Indian case on point is domestic
law of any kind displayed by CIL. Such a prospect is simply outside the realm
of possibility for federal nations now or in the near future.

259 Dietrich v R [1992] 177 CLR 292 Mason CJ, McHugh J and Dawson J 306 (three justices narrowly
interpreted that CIL was appropriate only for speaking into Australian common law ambiguities); Toohey J
360–61 (writing that CIL could inform both ambiguities and clear gaps in the common law); Brennan J 318–21
(writing that CIL could inform modifications or expansions to Australian common law subject to limits from
policy and a constitutional separation of powers) (Austl.).
260 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 168.
261 Western Australia v Ward [2002] 191 ALR 1 (Austl.).
262 Id. at para 958 (Austl.).
263 See id. at para 958 (Austl.).
264 Id. at para 958 (Austl.).
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For federal nations such as Australia and India to give such deep thought to
CIL, to consider the body of law from so many perspectives—many informing
and sharpening each other—may show far greater reverence for the body of
international law than an entire nation uniformly interpreting CIL in a single
manner in every court. As illustrated by the Indian and Australian experiences,
CIL can be successfully and dynamically engaged throughout the courts of a
federal nation. Now, the American implications must be considered.
III. IMPORTING LESSONS LEARNED
Overall, the comparative section found that harmoniously engaging and
implementing CIL in a federal nation’s state and federal courts is possible, and
does not require the extreme reach of the modernist or revisionist positions. In
turn, this section answers the Comment’s second question: what can be
gleaned for American edification from the Australian and Indian experiences
with CIL? This section finds that two particular modes of CIL implementation
utilized in Australia and India, with a bit of tweaking, may have potential in
American courts. Finally, this section considers the implications for CIL
patterns in Australian and Indian courts upon cries of American isolationism
relative to CIL, and finds both that any isolationism seems reasonably
characteristic of federal nations generally, not just the United States; and that
such isolationism should be less strongly associated with elitism or
exceptionalism and more with functional federal structure and psyche.
A. Two Modes of CIL Implementation Utilized in Australia and India May
Have Potential in American Courts
There exists no apparent evidence of major conflict amidst various federal
and state court interpretations of CIL in Australia and India. None of the
observed state court decisions appear to be overturned by higher courts. In
light of these findings, and contrary to the polarized extremes of leading
American theories, perhaps American state and federal courts promulgating a
variety of CIL interpretations and engagements would do no harm. Indeed,
Dean Robert Schapiro theorizes that such a variety of interpretations, a
“polyphonic federalism,” would behoove all parties involved.265 Two modes of
265 SCHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170 (“This understanding of customary international law as nonpreemptive
federal law fits well within a polyphonic framework. State courts and federal courts could develop diverse
perspectives and contribute to an ongoing debate about the content and application of customary international
law. This approach would allow customary international law to develop in nonuniform ways in state and
federal courts. The state and federal courts could engage in a collaborative process of illumination.”).
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receiving CIL would give American state and federal courts greater latitude to
embrace and interpret CIL. First, American courts could consider
implementing the Madras High Court’s proposed canon of interpreting
ambiguous municipal law in compliance with CIL. Second, American courts
could consider following Australian and Indian courts’ lead in interpreting
treaty commitments as CIL.
Again, where some argue that the matter simply is not pressing in
American jurisprudence, this Comment calls for a reassessment of cause and
effect. Are American state and federal courts not embracing CIL more because
the matter is patently irrelevant, or because the surrounding academic
discourse is seemingly impossible to rectify or implement? This Comment
asserts that the latter may be at least partly culpable for the lack of CIL
engagement, coupled with a limited scope of necessary judicial
exceptionalism.266
1. American Courts Could Consider Implementing the Madras High
Court’s Proposed Canon of Interpreting Ambiguous Municipal Law in
Compliance with CIL
Among the most timely candidates for consideration in the American
context is the Madras High Court’s proposed canon of interpretation, that
courts construe municipal law “in harmony with international law or treaty
obligations” 267 when multiple constructions are possible.268 This prospect also
resembles two of the Australian High Court’s propositions in Dietrich: three
justices interpreted that CIL could appropriately speak into common law
ambiguities,269 and a fourth asserted that CIL should be permitted to speak into
common law ambiguities and clear gaps alike.270 When municipal law rather
than common law is unclear, the need for resolution is equally strong.

266

See infra Part III.B.
Tamil Nadu Tamil & English Schools v. Tamil Nadu, 2000 (2) C.T.C. 344, available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/261579/.
268 While American use of the term “municipal law” means local law, and can be used to generally
reference domestic law in Europe, Indian use of the term is not as uniform. BEDERMAN, supra note 27, at 140
(on American and European uses). The Madras High Court’s intended meaning of the term in Tamil Nadu is
not explicit, though most likely references domestic law generally. See Tamil Nadu Tamil & English Schools
v. Tamil Nadu, 2000 (2) C.T.C. 344. For purposes of American importation, the canon proposal here will
employ the traditional American definition of “municipal law.”
269 Dietrich v R [1992] 177 CLR 292, 306 Mason CJ, McHugh J and Dawson J.
270 Id., Brennan J 318–21.
267
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Here, narrowing the discussion to CIL has particular potential in expanding
the role of CIL from only applying when expressly intended to any situation in
which it may be applicable and where the law at hand is open to interpretation.
Again, a mere canon of interpretation would not be as extreme as the monist
and modernist position of binding the entire nation to a single interpretation.
That said, a canon would not begin to resolve implementation of all CIL.
Rather, a canon would allow courts to lean toward CIL compliance when
municipal law interpretation was debatable.
In the American context, the equivalent would be a canon of interpretation
for ambiguous municipal, state and federal to be interpreted in concert with
CIL to which the nation has not consistently and vocally protested.271 This
canon would be a sort of cousin to the Charming Betsy canon, but specific to
the context of CIL. By definition, adherence to jus cogens must be included.
The Charming Betsy canon, promulgated by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, proposed to interpret congressional statutes as
consistent with international law.272 While the Charming Betsy canon itself is
no stranger to calls for inapplicability to CIL, largely on grounds of
circumventing Congress’ legislative role,273 the caveat repeatedly articulated in
Indian and Australian precedent may resolve the separation of powers matter:
no CIL in direct conflict with standing domestic law should be domestically
incorporated.274
While some may be concerned that this canon would lead to a parade of
horribles for ATS litigation, this canon would not permit that prospect. The
violation of any ambiguous law, if construed to mesh with CIL, would still be
a violation of that law itself and not directly of CIL. That is, unless the law was
expressly codifying CIL—which hardly seems plausible for the American
context.
Consider how such a canon, if part of common law throughout the United
States, might revolutionize a case like Medellin v. Texas.275 Therein, nearly a
decade of litigation in state, federal and world courts alike—including two
271 A more elaborate analysis would further consider the separation of powers matters therein. For now,
this Comment will leave the matter at asserting that any court would always have the option of simply
interpreting a given law as non-ambiguous, avoiding the canon altogether.
272 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); see Bradley, supra note 1, at 685.
273 The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary International Law, supra note 9, at
1227.
274 See supra Parts II.B.–II.C.
275 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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trips the United States Supreme Court, displaying an unprecedented time-anda-half for oral argument before the justices at the behest of Chief Justice
Roberts;276 and two trips to the International Court of Justice277—never
resolved a matter of municipal officers’ responsibility to inform detained
foreign nationals of their consular rights. In signing the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the American federal government committed to the
international community that foreign nationals’ consular rights would be
upheld during detention. Congress never passed executing legislation, and
American courts had no canon of interpretation such as the Madras High Court
proposed. While federalism allowed that states and municipalities were under
little legal obligation to the federal government to respect consular rights, and
no obligation whatsoever directly to the world beyond the federal government,
the federal government was unable to keep its word to the international
community. Would the Roberts Court dispense with the matter by asserting
that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was relatively
inconsequential to Texas authorities as non-binding domestic legislation if
such a canon was in practice? Perhaps not.
2. American Courts Could Consider Following Australian and Indian
Courts’ Lead in Interpreting Treaty Commitments as CIL
The second potential import is a broad construction of treaty commitments
as CIL. While seemingly rash and sweeping, this strategy would only mildly
expand the Obama administration’s own statement on the State Department
website that parts of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are CIL.278
If some parts of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are CIL, why
not other treaties to which the U.S. and a majority of states of the world or a
given region are party?

276

LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN EMPIRICAL
APPROACH ix–x (2008) (“The comments and questions from the justices were so frequent and heated that
Justice John Paul Stevens, ever gracious on the bench, told the Solicitor General of Texas that he would like to
hear the six points in the advocate’s argument ‘without interruption by my colleagues.’ Chief Justice Roberts
did something that was unprecedented: he gave each side fifteen minutes extra time to argue their case;
scheduled for an hour, the oral argument lasted an hour and a half. By the end, the justices had directed 122
questions or comments to the petitioner’s attorney and 93 to the respondent’s.”).
277 See generally Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. (Jul. 16).
278 Notably, mirroring the earlier mentioned shift from CIL as purely concerning state relations to
concerning individuals’ rights. See supra Part I.D.

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

I, TOO, SING AMERICA

171

Both Dow Jones and PUCL drew upon Indian and Australian commitment
as signatories to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,279
considering treaty law as potential CIL.280 Particularly for federal governments,
where matters like signing treaties and interpreting laws are not performed by a
single unitary system, such fuller discussions of CIL and treaty law in tandem
are always wise. U.S. courts would do well take the Indian and Australian
discourse a step further, embracing discussions of international treaty
obligations as CIL when the treaties in question are non-self-executing and
when no implementing legislation exists.
The subjection of another Mexican national to capital punishment in Texas
in January 2014, after being denied his consular rights, solemnly demonstrated
that the Medellin issue remains in grave need of resolution.281 One day prior to
Edgar Tamayo’s execution, the Fifth Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court denied Tamayo’s appeal for cert.282 The Fifth Circuit noted,
We respect the concerns expressed by the executive branch, such as
Secretary of State Kerry who wrote a letter on Tamayo’s behalf, but
“we have no authority to stay an execution in light of an ‘appeal of
the President’” presenting free-ranging assertions of foreign policy
consequences, when those assertions come unaccompanied by a
persuasive legal claim.283

Something as simple as construing treaty commitments as CIL could one day
be a “persuasive legal claim.” The Fifth Circuit pointed to a 2011 United States
Supreme Court decision, Leal Garcia v. Texas, “noting the failure of Congress
to enact implementing legislation and stating that ‘[i]f a statute implementing
Avena had genuinely been a priority for the political branches, it would have
been enacted by now.’”284 Where the lack of legislative implementation may
(or may not) be more an issue of political stalemate than apathy, this canon of
treaty interpretation offers another way out. So long as non-self-executing
279 People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568, paras.
21–24; WADEHRA, supra note 229, at 362.
280 Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] 194 ALR 433, 116 (Austl.); Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 457.
281 Manny Fernandez, Texas Executes Mexican for Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A17,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/texas-executes-mexican-for-murder.html.
282 Tamayo v. Stephens, 134 S.Ct. 1021 (2014) (“The application for stay of execution of sentence of
death presented to Justice Scalia and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari
is denied. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor would grant the application for stay of
execution.”); Tamayo v. Perry, 740 F.3d 991 (5th Cir. 2014).
283 Tamayo 740 F.3d at 997 (quoting Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868 (2011) (per curiam)
(internal citations omitted)).
284 Id. at 997.
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treaty obligations could be read as CIL, this canon could circumvent the matter
of non-binding domestic legislation and bind municipalities to upholding
foreign nationals’ consular rights whenever the municipal law on point
permitted multiple constructions.
To be sure, such a canon would be far from a glorious fix-all. Particularly,
this canon would only characterize as CIL those treaties that a majority of
states signed, by the basic definition of CIL. If such a canon could bring the
United States a single step closer to resolving its lamentable consular rights
(and broader international relations) debacle, the nation’s international
relations and international diplomatic capital would increase.285 The United
States could comply with one more facet of CIL, levying stronger arguments of
legitimate exceptionalism on functional and procedural grounds, rather than
exceptionalism for its own sake, regarding the points of CIL that the nation
intentionally left unimplemented.
Considering the sweeping nature of this proposition, seemingly
circumventing the legislature from a role relative to treaties, a thought from
Australian precedent reemerges. West Australia v Ward discussions on
potential legislation, while not directly asserting resolution, propose an even
richer body of consideration and engagement of the other federal branches,
potentially avoiding the Medellin issue recounted above.286 Richness aside, the
necessary involvement of the legislative branch in the promulgation of new
laws is a basic reality of any federal structure. A central policy consideration
raised by the Australia High Court in Western Australia that rings equally true
in the American context is the prospective rise of promissory estoppel theory
concerning implementing customary international law into domestic commonlaw without any pertinent legislation. Again, the basic definitional
understanding of CIL provides a stopgap from a parade of horribles. Jus
cogens aside, nations are not bound to CIL if they vocally and persistently did
not intend to be legally bound. Any legislation expressing intent not to be
bound by a certain treaty would preempt the application of either canon
proposed here.

285 See Fernandez, supra note 281 (“The case became an international issue that Mexican officials and
Secretary of State John Kerry said threatened to strain relations between the two countries. Mr. Tamayo’s
arrest in Houston in 1994 on charges of murdering a police officer violated the international treaty known as
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The authorities neglected to tell him of his right under the
Vienna Convention to notify Mexican diplomats.”).
286 Western Australia v Ward [2002] 191 ALR 1, para 958 (Austl.). That is, both other branches would be
involved through legislative promulgation of laws and the executive branch’s approval.
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B. Seeming Exceptionalism in Resistance to CIL is At Least Partially Valid
for Most Federal Nations, and Need Not Be So Closely Associated with
“Navel-Gazing”287
While the two proposed canons would expand the role of CIL in American
courts, and are offered in good faith that such expansion is in the United
States’ best interests, proponents of domestic CIL expansion must understand
that some limits of and pushback from CIL are inevitable.288 This resistance is
inevitable not because of elitism, as is frequently implied,289 but because of
federalism itself. And not only because of federalism’s separation of powers,
as Bradley and Goldsmith assert, but because of federalism’s psyche.
CIL engagement requires a tailor-made approach for any federal nation.
Former colonies, in particular, are each in different developmental phases
establishing identity and independence; those developmental phases often
include seasons of stringent reliance upon domestic precedent, followed by a
reemergence of willingness to look outside.290 While India appears to have
quickly reached that willingness to look outside, despite a broad domestic
precedent,291 and Australia is at least somewhat open to considering
international law,292 the United States is arguably not yet there. Justice Scalia,
for instance, argues that America’s founding fathers wanted nothing to do with
international law and that he is of like mind.293 On the other hand, when
provoked over the merits of considering foreign law as persuasive authority for

287 Marcus, supra note 7, at 710 (“[American procedural] exceptionalism also reinforces the tendency to
view such navel-gazing as appropriate because procedure is peculiarly parochial.”).
288 The same is said of American civil procedure. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and
Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 278 (2002) (“[T]he well-documented idiosyncrasies of
American culture are reflected in the procedural rules that govern civil litigation.”).
289 Cf. Langbein, supra note 7, at 554 (“American jurists are disinclined to interest themselves in foreign
example for the same reason that scientists at American medical schools are disinclined to investigate the
merits of medicine as it is practiced among the witch doctors of the Amazonian rain forest. They operate on the
assumption that the foreigners have nothing to teach. . . . [T]he disdain for Continental law rests upon a witch’s
brew of ignorance, prejudice, and venality.”).
290 See Smith, supra note 10, at 230 (“[I]n a post-colonial state, a period during which the courts manifest
a desire to reduce reliance on the colonial power’s laws will sometimes be followed by a recognition of the
value of the colonial system’s precedents. This process—which occurred in India—may indicate the end of the
post-colonial, independence phase of nation building, and the beginnings of a more nuanced relationship
between former colonialists and colonizers.”).
291 Id. at 239.
292 See supra Part II.B.
293 See Justice Antonin Scalia, Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices, supra note 25.
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American decisions, Justice Breyer explains, “I can read what I want.”294 If the
arch Adam Smith asserts regarding former colonies’ eventual openness to
outside precedent will prove true for the United States, perhaps the turn is
simply a few generations off. At any rate, the turn cannot be forced. The
mindset at play appears to have little to do with externally defined identity,
relative to the outside world, (as implied by cries of elitism and
exceptionalism); but far more to do with an internally-defined identity simply
does not consider the outside world.295
While writing specifically on America’s lacking embrace of foreign law,
Smith noted that the isolation of general American exceptionalist jurisprudence
“is arguably a reasonable reaction to the forces impacting the American
judicial system,” “given the unique structure and placement of the American
Supreme Court—and indeed the entirety of the U.S. judicial system.”296 While
some nations whose judicial powers are not so broadly disbursed may need to
rely on CIL simply to supplement holes in their own precedent, “the United
States is large and heterogeneous enough to keep producing novel, complex
legal problems on which domestic courts will be able to draw.”297 The breadth
of American, Australian, and Indian precedent—arguably the result of broad
court structures facilitated by federal systems—leaves the nations’ courts less
likely to look to CIL as a gap-filler,298 which could naturally skew perceptions
of their reticence to look to CIL when that brand of law is more directly at
issue.299
Deference to domestic laws in the United States is a prequalification for
any new engagement of CIL, as demonstrated in Australia and India alike.
Australia and India considered this reality in a variety of scenarios, but perhaps
most notably in their parallel claw back provisions when asserting theories of
CIL engagement. In Chow Hung v Ching, the Australia High Court willingly

294 Ashby Jones, ‘I Can Read What I Want,’ Says Breyer on International-Law [sic] Debate, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2010, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/02/i-can-read-what-i-want-says-breyeron-international-law-debate/.
295 See VAN DER VYVER, supra note 1, at 11 (“I am well aware of the fact that, as far as perceptions
entertained by the outside world community are concerned, most Americans don’t care two hoots.”).
296 See supra Introduction; Smith, supra note 10, at 222.
297 Smith, supra note 10, at 230.
298 This CIL analysis runs parallel to Smith’s assertion that nations with new or weak judiciaries are more
likely to lean on foreign law more frequently. Smith, supra note 10, at 264.
299 For what it is worth, Smith asserted that relative to foreign law, India’s isolationism would be
“difficult to maintain,” and that even the United States’ will come in time to consider foreign law just as
American states now supplement their own common law with each others’. Smith, supra note 10, at 267, 269.
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acknowledged the existence of CIL as “a body of rules which nations accept
among themselves,” and expressed an openness to incorporating CIL into
domestic law to whatever degree it was consistent with the standing laws of the
land.300 Likewise, in Vellore, the India Supreme Court surmised that domestic
law was “almost accepted” as automatically incorporated into domestic law to
whatever degree it harmonized with standing municipal law.301 To this end,
federal nations are likely to hold in solidarity no matter the chagrin of
European sentiment.302
The United States’ particular brand of federalism has a history of creating
roadblocks to American participation in international law and international
legal circles. The unique position of federal nations in relation to international
law, and the pressing need for resolution on such matters, is illustrated in
former International Court of Justice Judge Thomas Buergenthal’s dissent to
the 2008 reinterpretation of Mexico v. The United States.303 Buergenthal
contended that the World Court mistakenly took the actions of one state,
Texas, to speak authoritatively for the nation as a whole: “a state of the United
States . . . does not and cannot speak for the United States on the international
plane.”304 The misunderstanding between the United States and the
international legal community on the American federal identity carried
grievous consequences. Buergenthal explained further,
[t]he finding by the [U.S.] Supreme Court that the Avena Judgment is
not directly applicable law without implementing legislation and that
the [U.S.] President lacks the authority without Congressional action
to order the States to comply with the Avena judgment concerns
principles of United States constitutional law relating to the
allocation of power between the three branches of the United States.
They have no bearing as such on the compliance or non-compliance
by the United States with its international obligations.305

While Medellin and Avena revolved around a treaty and were not particularly
concerned with matters of CIL, the conflict facing a federal state engaging
outside law remains the same. Federalism boasts a myriad of internal benefits
300 Charlesworth et al., supra note 155, at 452, citing Chow Hung Ching v The King [1948] 77 CLR 449 at
470–71.
301 Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 5 SCC 647 (1996), A.I.R. 1996 SC 2715.
302 Smith, supra note 10, at 266 (noting “[g]rowing European legal amalgamation”).
303 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. (Jul. 16) (diss. op. Buergenthal, J).
304 Id. at 340.
305 Id. at 339 (emphasis added).

DAVIS GALLEYSPROOFS2

176

12/19/2014 9:28 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

in decentralized lawmaking. But when it comes to engaging the world external
to the federal nation, conflicts of law abound. Some resolution must be
attempted in the days ahead.
C. Conclusion: The Lessons Learned from India and Australia Are Primely
Applicable to the American Experience
Undoubtedly, not every case in state or federal court could or should be
informed by CIL. Australian and Indian courts certainly do not look to CIL for
persuasion in every case before their courts. But CIL is clearly a fruitful aid in
working through the legal matters of more than a single issue—and a scope
extending beyond the mere post-sentence criminal matters to which the vast
majority of American state courts currently confine their glances toward CIL.
Where Australia’s endeavors to lean on CIL are moderate, India goes further;
particularly in its high courts. Indian state courts do not seem to have trouble
incorporating CIL as domestic law. Again, their relatively unitary judiciary
makes for a more seamless process in this endeavor.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE, AND
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This Comment’s findings do not purport to provide complete resolution to
the status of CIL in American courts. Based on the rich reflections afforded
from the limited foreign cases assessed here, however, there is likely much to
be gained from further comparative study. In first asking whether there existed
a yet-attempted approach to address the unresolved state of CIL in American
courts, this Comment identified an absence of comparative analysis and
engaged in comparative study. The comparative analysis of Indian and
Australian state and federal court CIL precedent revealed that CIL could,
indeed, be harmoniously engaged and/or implemented in a federal nation’s
state and federal courts; that CIL engagement and/or implementation did not
require the extreme reach of American modernist or revisionist theories; CIL
enriched judicial decisions even when only engaged and not implemented; and
that CIL engagement always requires an approach tailored to a given nation.
Particularly, this Comment found that just as some academics assert that state
courts are fruitful forums for engaging foreign law, state courts are equally
fruitful forums for engaging CIL. In subsequently asking how those findings
may inform the American experience with CIL, this Comment surmised that
two of India and Australia’s practices—interpreting ambiguous municipal law
in comity with CIL, and considering treaties to which the U.S. and a majority
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of world or region states are members to have CIL status—may be worth
implementing in state and American courts. Finally, through considering the
post-colonial federalism experiences of Australia, India, and the United States
alike, their isolationist jurisprudences could be seen as functions of federal
structure and federal psyche rather than indulgent exceptionalism.
As Kiobel’s progeny trickle through American courts, likely renewing
interest in CIL more generally, American courts may be well served by greater
comparative study of how similarly structured nations are approaching the
engagement and implementation of CIL. Unlike engaging foreign law, in
which American courts will nearly always have a choice, the matter of CIL is
unavoidable.306
American state courts require a distinctly federalist answer for a
distinctively federalist problem in the United States. Perhaps one reason for
resistance to CIL in the United States is because of federalism, concerning
separation of powers; perhaps that concern does not exist in comparison
countries, which view international law as a distinctively national, not local,
issue. Australia and India do not face the same concerns through their
relatively centralized judicial structures.307 Still, the nations provide hope for
an American way forward. The lessons of Australia and India can and should
be tailored toward an American theory for engaging and implementing CIL.
Such a theory is possible and meritorious; it does not have to be as polarized as
the modernist or revisionist stance; and it has to be uniquely tailored to the
nation’s structure and tradition. Canons interpreting ambiguous laws in comity
with CIL and treaty commitments as evidence of CIL may pave the way for
broader American precedent, positioning American courts to more comfortably
cite each other rather than looking to foreign precedent, which still seems
generally avoided in the United States. A more nuanced, less villainized sense
of American exceptionalist jurisprudence may help the nation’s courts
unapologetically and accessibly handle one facet of CIL at a time. The view
outside American borders provides a much-needed fresh perspective on the

306

See supra Introduction.
Bruce Ackerman characterized India as a “perfectly healthy federalism[] operating without a powerful
federalist chamber at the center,” and Australia as “a fascinating hybrid of British and American elements.”
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 670, 672 (2000).
307
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domestic status of CIL to focus discourse and encourage a solution for the
United States.
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